The Federal Courts and the American
Law Institute
PART II

David P. Curriet

FEDERAL-QUESTION JURISDICTION

I have less to say about federal-question jurisdiction, because the ALI
has done much better with this subject than with diversity. The jurisdiction itself, unlike diversity, is not very controversial, despite the
well-known fact that it did not exist in the trial courts until 1875;224
it seems dear that if we are to have original federal jurisdiction at all
it ought to extend to the enforcement of federal rights. The Institute
accurately marshals the arguments: Federal judges have relative expertise in dealing with federal law; uniform interpretation is promoted
by federal jurisdiction; state courts may be hostile to federal law. Supreme Court review of state courts, limited by narrow review of the
facts, the debilitating possibilities of delay, and the necessity of deferring to adequate state grounds of decision, cannot do the whole job.
The Institute endorses the general federal-question jurisdiction of the
district courts in order "to protect litigants relying on federal law from
the danger that state courts will not properly apply that law, either
through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy. '225 I agree, and I shall
not expand on the argument for the jurisdiction.
One difficulty with federal-question jurisdiction is that nobody knows
how to define it. Its constitutional scope is quite broad. Despite smoke
screens thrown up by dissenting opinions, 22 however, the Supreme
Court has never suggested the jurisdiction includes the vast category
of cases in which there are potential federal issues. The test of the
famous Osborni case is rather that the case must contain some "ingret Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This is the second installment of a twopart article. The first part appeared in the Fall i968 Issue, 36 U. CHI. L. kEV. 1-49.
224 See H. M. HART & H. WECHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THm FEDERAL SYsTEm 72750 (1953).
225 TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 69-74 (1968).
226 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 874-6 (1824) (Johnson,
J.); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 358 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.).
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dient" of federal law. 227 It suffices under the Constitution that a part
of the case is federal, for example the authority of the National Bank
to contract. There is nothing very remarkable about this, or very
mysterious either; Professor Mishkin rightly says the federal government must be able to protect its interests against state hostility by
opening its own courts, even when federal law forms only one rather
remote element in the case. The key to the problem is Mr. Mishkin's
insistence that a federal "claim" rather than "question" is the essence
of the jurisdiction: A federal right may need federal-court protection
even if its scope is settled beyond controversy. 228 Mr. Justice Frankfurter to the contrary notwithstanding, the ingredient test remains an
appropriate minimum interpretation of Article III. The controversy
over the permissibility of protective jurisdiction in the absence of such
229
a federal ingredient has been discussed above.
The real difficulty arises because the statutory language, sensibly, has
been more narrowly construed than its constitutional counterpart.
Again Mr. Mishkin supplies the justification: While the power must
exist to protect federal corporations, for example, in all their dealings,
it is unlikely that Congress meant, absent a showing of local hostility,
to burden the federal courts with a great many cases whose resolution
was likely to depend entirely upon state law. 230 The case of the federal
corporation has been specifically excluded by statute, except when the
United States is majority stockholder.2 31 But there are other exceptions,
judicially created, that create problems of application.
1. The Well-Pleaded Complaint; Removal
The best-known and perhaps the most-criticized exception to federalquestion jurisdiction is the well-pleaded-complaint rule, which excludes from the federal trial courts most cases in which the federal
claim is not a part of the plaintiff's original complaint. 232 In addition,
the Court's willingness to tie this test to technical pleading rules unrelated to jurisdictional policy233 makes the rule operate capriciously
and adds complexity to the determination of jurisdiction. The Court's
227

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).

REV. 157,
162-3, 168-71 (1953).
229 See text at notes 68-73 supra. [Footnotes 1-223 appear in Part I of this article at 36
U. CH. L. REv. 1-49 (1968).]
230 Mishkin, supra note 228, 53 COLUM. L. Rxv. at 162-3.
231 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
232 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
233 See, e.g., White v. Sparkill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500, 512 (1930); and compare
Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917), with Marshall v. Desert Properties Co,, 103 F.2d
551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 563 (1939).
228 Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLUM. L.
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apparent suggestion that in declaratory-judgment actions the test requires investigation of the rules governing pleading in a hypothetical
coercive action, 234 while faithful to the Declaratory Judgments Act's
statement that the statute does not affect jurisdiction,235 increases the
burden of threshold litigation. And the general statutory limitation of
removal to cases that could originally have been brought in federal
court 236 assures that the well-pleaded-complaint rule deprives most litigants of a federal trial court's protection of federal rights asserted in
defense or reply.
The excuse for this rule has been that it spares the courts the uncertainty of guessing whether federal issues will be raised after the complaint and enables the jurisdictional determination to be made at the
outset. 23 This policy is deserving; it would be wasteful if federal courts
either proceeded to judgment with the risk of a tardy dismissal for
failure of a federal question to appear or accepted removal of cases
that had been nearly completed before a federal point was raised.
Cutting off access to a federal court before the answer is filed, though,
may be carrying a good thing too far, since the defendant's need for a
federal forum seems quite as great as the plaintiff's. Moreover, such
insistence on an immediate determination of jurisdiction is not compatible with the present provision allowing the defendant to remove
when the plaintiff's claim is federal. 238 I agree with the present law and
with the ALI that the expenditure of state-court effort between complaint and answer does not justify depriving the defendant of a federal
court to protect against misunderstanding of the plaintiff's federal
right; 239 a fortiori, the same wasted effort does not justify depriving the
defendant of federal protection for his own federal right.
The Institute proposes to allow removal on the basis of certain
federal claims raised subsequent to the complaint, but it does not
authorize the plaintiff to obtain original federal jurisdiction by anticipating such a claim. 240 This is right enough, though it may lead to a
game of musical chairs like that which forced me to object to barring
the local plaintiff's invoking diversity. 241 The difference is that, while
234 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Possibly the Court
only held the federal matter was not required to be pleaded by the declaratory plaintiff.
But see H. M. HART & H. WECHSiLE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 774
(1953).
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the existence of diversity is plain from the complaint, a case does not
arise under federal law until the federal claim is made. This point is
practical as well as technical: The diversity defendant cannot defeat
jurisdiction once attached, as could the defendant with an anticipated
federal claim, by failing to make his defense. Thus, to allow anticipation by the federal-question plaintiff would not as in the diversity case
assure early final resolution of jurisdiction.
Commendably, for the enlightenment of the attorney, the ALI proposes to codify the well-pleaded-complaint rule, conferring original
jurisdiction of actions "in which the initial pleading sets forth a substantial claim" arising under federal law. 242 Commendably, the draft
disposes of the declaratory-suit problem by applying the same test to
actions "for a declaratory judgment. ' 243 Looking to the actual declaratory complaint simplifies the determination and fully meets the reason
for the rule: early assurance that the federal claim is really in the case.
Continued reliance on pleading rules does perpetuate rather arbitrary
decisions and increases complexity, but no simpler or more appropriate
test suggests itself, and the importance of the problem is greatly minimized by the provision for removal and by the sensible provision allowing the federal court to try cases originally but erroneously filed
there if a federal claim has since been made. 244 With these amendments
it does not seem worthwile to put much effort into devising a more
perfect test of original federal jurisdiction in this regard.
The provision for federal-defense removal was a source of considerable controversy within the Institute. The final product is a compromise falling short of the goal and inviting threshold litigation. To
begin with, over the Reporters' mild objection, 245 there is a $10,000
jurisdictional amount.2 46 This is odd only because the Institute proposes to eliminate the amount requirement for original federal-question
2 47
jurisdiction and for removal based upon the plaintiff's federal claim.
Though "the national government should bear the burden of providing a forum" to people with federal claims, and though the infrequency of removal in federal-question cases, the great majority of which
require no amount, shows that "removal is not now frequently used as
a harassing tactic by defendants," the ALI fears that the new opportunity for federal-defense removal might be used "as a harassing tactic in
242 TENT. DRAar No. 6, at 5, § 1311(a).
243 Id.

§ 1312(d).
245 Id. at 101-3.
246 Id. at 6, § 1312(a)(2).
247 Id. at 5, 6, §§ 1311(a), 1812(a)(1).
244 Id. at 8,
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small cases in which the claim is grounded on state law." 248 Why defendants should be thought more likely than plaintiffs to abuse their right
to a federal forum is not explained, nor why invocation of that right
should be deemed improper. The distinction has no merit; the amount
249
should be required for both parties or for neither.
There are other exceptions to the ALI's proposal for federal-defense
removal. First, the federal defense must be "dispositive of the action
or of all counterclaims therein."25 0 Removal on the basis of such defenses as that the plaintiff's evidence was obtained in violation of federal
law or that damages are limited by the Warsaw Convention is thus
forbidden: "[S]ince the action will ultimately be resolved by state law,
the need for a federal forum is less pressing."251 Moreover, neither
constitutional immunity from state process, constitutional objection
to choice of law, nor the federally guaranteed bar of a sister-state judg252 "Most
ment or a bankruptcy decree is to be a ground for removal:
challenges to state 'long arm' statutes are today foreclosed by prior Supreme Court decisions, and would not raise a 'substantial defense' ";
even when a substantial issue is presented, "[t]he objection to process
... is a dilatory one, which does not go to the merits," and in every
case there is a preliminary question of the reach of state law. As for the
choice of law and res judicata issues, "[w]hether these are defenses
that 'arise under' federal law and whether they are 'substantial' are
questions that are not dear. It is clear that removal on this ground
2 53
should not be allowed." No reasons are given.
Moreover, actions by a state or its officer, agency, or subdivision to
enforce the state or local "constitution, statutes, ordinances, or administrative regulations' 25 4 are not to be removable on the basis of federal
defenses because "proper respect for the states suggests that they should
be allowed to use their own courts for routine matters of law enforcement," except in special situations such as civil rights or suits against
federal officers. For no apparent reason this exception is deliberately
made inapplicable to claims based on state common law.2 55 Finally,
private eminent-domain cases are made non-removable despite federal
defenses: Removal of most condemnations will be prohibited by the
248 Id. at 78, 79, 101, 103.
249 For general consideration of the jurisdictional amount, see text at notes 367-98
infra.
250 TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 6, § 1312(a)(2).
251 Id. at 105.
252 Id. at 7-8, 110-1, § 1312(b)(7), (8).
253 Id. at 110-1.
254 Or suits against the state to require enforcement. Id. at 7, § 1812(b)(5).
255 Id. at 109.
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clause just discussed, and therefore private condemnation proceedings
256
should not be removed either.
Much of this reasoning is unpersuasive. Abuse of the new provision
by the assertion of frivolous defenses seems no more likely with respect
to personal jurisdiction than to other issues, and in any case the problem is amply resolved by the long-standing requirement that the federal
claim must be substantial, 257 a requirement the ALI properly proposes to make explicit in the statute. 258 That some of these cases do not
"arise under" federal law in the sense of the well-pleaded-complaint
rule is irrelevant; no federal-defense cases do, and that federal law does
259
affect both choice of law and respect for judgments is indisputable.
State-court hostility or misunderstanding seems no less probable in any
of the excepted cases than in those the Institute would make removable; indeed the likelihood of anti-federal bias must be at its height
when the state sues in its own courts. Federal issues as to personal jurisdiction, choice of law, res judicata, illegal evidence, and compensation
for takings are often intensely factual, so that Supreme Court review
may prove inadequate protection. The ALI's tautological view that
it is less serious to be gypped out of a point of evidence or damages
than out of a whole case does not prove that federal rights to less than
the whole deserve no protection, for they are often far from insignificant. And the argument respecting private condemnation suits is no
argument at all, since the reasons for excluding comparable state suits
are admittedly inapplicable.
The respectable arguments for the ALI's exceptions from federaldefense removal are thus reducible to two: the desirability of allowing
states to enforce their laws in their own courts and the undesirability
of burdening the federal courts with numerous questions of state law.
A federal trial seems necessary in all the excepted cases if uniform
vindication of federal rights is to be assured, but the cost of this assurance may be too high. When the plaintiff's claim is federal, the
case is likely to be dominated by federal issues, although there may
be threshold questions of state law, as when state action is sought to
be enjoined. Every federal-defense case contains issues of state law;
when the defense is on the merits and dispositive of the action, the mix
of federal and state matters is likely to approximate that of the suit to
enjoin state action. But when the federal issue is collateral, like per256 Id. at 7, § 1312(b)(6); id. at 109-10.

257 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
258 TENT. DRAFr No. 6, at 5, § 1311(a); id. at 81-83.
259 See, e.g., Crider V. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Durfee V. Duke, 375 U.S. 106

(1963).
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sonal jurisdiction, there are not only state-law matters related to the
federal issue itself (e.g., the interpretation of a state long-arm statute);
there may also be an entire trial on the merits governed entirely by
state law. Pendent jurisdiction allows the federal court to avoid wasted
effort by adjudicating the entire case, but the expenditure of federal
resources and the invasion of state judicial prerogative are large. The
ALI's proposal to forbid removal based on such relatively peripheral
issues as personal jurisdiction, choice of law, res judicata, illegal evidence, and excessive damages is therefore in complete accord with
Professor William Cohen's recent and valuable insight that original
federal-question jurisdiction should be determined pragmatically in
the light of, among other things, the relative dominance of federal and
state issues. 260 I cannot object to these exceptions; they will probably be
easy to administer, and they will keep a healthy volume of local issues
out of federal courts.
More troublesome is the exception for state enforcement cases, with
its unexplained omission of suits arising under common law. These
cases will often be substantially federal; the reason for excluding them
from federal court is not the dominance of local issues but respect for
the states. This respect seems entirely appropriate in criminal cases,
which Congress has scrupulously left to state courts except in instances
of extreme federal interest or state hostility, such as prosecutions of
federal officers or of persons unable to enforce their civil rights in state
court.261 It may not be so pressing in civil cases, but it is worthy of consideration; I cannot oppose this exception very strongly, as it rests upon
a reasonable balancing of the need for federal protection against the
state's interest in being able to enforce its own laws. But I would delete
the exception for private condemnation suits, which seem to me to present no special problems either of deference to state interest or of
dominant state-law issues.
Present law forbids removal of federal counterclaims. The plaintiff
cannot remove because removal is limited to "defendants"; 262 the defendant presumably cannot because the original action was not cognizable in federal court. 263 If state practice makes the counterclaim com260 Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"
Under FederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L. Rxv. 890, 906-7, 916 (1967).
261 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1443 (1964). In criminal cases, too, the myriad of federal
procedural objections would practically destroy state criminal jurisdiction and burden the
federal courts with state-law issues if removal were allowed.
262 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 315 U.S. 100 (1941).
263 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964). The notion that the counterclaim itself is the relevant
"civil action" seems contrary to the holding in the Shamrock case, supra note 262, that
the relevant "defendant" is the party against whom the original action was brought.
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pulsory, this law is likely to deprive the defendant of a federal forum.
Consequently the Institute proposes to allow removal by a defendant
asserting a federal claim compulsory under state law and by a party
against whom any federal counterclaim is asserted. 264 This accords
with the policy underlying federal-claim and federal-defense removal,
but simplicity would be served without any adverse effect I can see
by eliminating the burdensome inquiry respecting state compulsorycounterclaim rules and allowing either party to remove whenever a
federal counterclaim is made.
Federal defenses to counterclaims are to provide a basis for removal, 2

5

but federal replies to state-law defenses to state-law claims

are not. An earlier draft, loyal to the policy of providing a federal forum
to vindicate federal rights, had authorized federal-reply removal; 206
but the late stage at which replies are asserted is one minor argument
in the other direction, 26 7 and the probable dominance of state issues in
a reply case is another. 26 8 But if the plaintiff attacks the validity of a
state-law defense, the federal question is likely to be of some importance
in the case, and I should prefer to extend removal to federal rights
claimed at any stage of the pleadings, and in any removal petition
filed before trial.
Removal of Jones Act, FELA, and Fair Labor Standards Act actions,
and of suits for lost or damaged freight under the Carmack Amendment, is to be forbidden. 2 9 In part this bar is a continuation of present
law; 270 the entire package represents a policy decision to respect the

forum choice of a widows-and-orphans type of plaintiff, and I see no
reason to criticize or to extend it. It is an improvement on present law
because it eliminates considerable uncertainty, and I do not feel strongly
about the defendant's access to a federal forum when it is the plaintiff
who would suffer from any state hostility.
264 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 6, § 1312(a)(3). No jurisdictional amount is to be required.
265 Id. at 6, § 1312(a)(2).
266 TENT. DRAFT No. 4, at 6, § 1312(a)(3) (1966).

267 But cf. removal on the basis of an answer to a counterclaim, which cannot be raised
sooner than in a reply.
268 The ALI has used this one. See TENT. DRAFT No. 5, at 98-99 (1967).
269 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 7, § 1312(b)(1)-(4).
270 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1964) (FELA; $3000 minimum for Carmack removal); Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1952) (Jones Act). The FLSA cases conflict. Compare Wilkins v. Renault Southwest, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D. Tex. 1964)
(absurdly holding removal "expressly" barred, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964). by a pro-

vision that such actions "may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction'),
with Asher v. William L. Crow Constr. Co., 118 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), allowing
removal.
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The emasculated 27' provision of section 1443(l) for removal by defendants unable to enforce equal federal rights in state courts is to be
preserved without improvemient;2 72 section 1443(2), which has become
superfluous by interpretation,2 78 is slated for virtual repeal; 27 4 and,
thank goodness, the ALI intends to reverse the pointless court-created
principle that an action within exclusive federal jurisdiction cannot be
27 5
removed.
2. Additional Problems of Definition
Not all cases in which the plaintiff's claim contains a federal element
are within the statutory original jurisdiction. In every case involving
a federal corporation or the ownership of a patent or copyright, for
example, the federal existence of the company or of the property may
be implicit in the plaintiff's case; but the improbability of a challenge
on these remote grounds has led to the common-sense exclusion of the
corporation cases by statute2 7 and of the property cases (including
those relating to the ownership of land long ago obtained from the
United States) by court decision. 27 Unfortunately, there is no very
good way to express these exceptions in the statute. The ALI toyed
with the idea of codification but concluded that it was better to say
nothing, because the present rules are fairly well understood although
2 78
hard to formulate, and because any change would create uncertainty.
It is regrettable that the circle cannot be squared, but the Institute
and Professor Cohen 279 are right that we have better things to do than
to keep trying the impossible.
People have tried for years to enunciate a comprehensive definition
of federal-question cases. The Supreme Court from time to time has
said a case arises under federal law when the cause of action is federally
271 See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 US. 808 (1966).
272 TENT. DAFT No. 6, at 8, § 1312(c).
273 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra note 257.
274 TENT. DRAr No. 6, at 9. The narrow provision for removal by a state officer prosecuted for compliance with federal law is preserved in the proposed § 1312(c). Federalofficer removal is considered in text at notes 347-9 and the problem of the civil-rights
defendant in text at notes 569-87 infra.
275 See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916); TENT.
DRAFr No. 6, at 8, § 1312(d).
276 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
277 See, e.g., Shulthis v. McDotigal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912) (land); American Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.§. 257 (1916) (patent); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,
339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 881 U.S. 915 (1965) (copyright).
278 TENT. DRAT No. 6, at 83-85. The Reporters also feared the term "direct" might
overrule Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); see note 283 infra.
279 Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"
Under FederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 907 (1967).
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created, 2 0 or when federal law must be construed. 281 But the former
test is little help in the problem cases in which some elements are
federal and some state; the latter would exclude the clearly cognizable
cases in which the law is clear but a federal right needs federal vindication 28 2 and include cases in which a state has adopted federal standards
for its own purposes. The cases are terribly confused on the incorporation-by-reference problem; 28 3 I see no federal interest in hearing such
controversies, and the statute could profitably and clearly be made to
exclude them by requiring that federal law operate of its own force in
28 4
order to support jurisdiction.
The converse case has occasionally caused trouble. Federally given
rights are often defined by reference to state law, either out of deference
to state interests or because of the convenience of utilizing an existing
standard. People have wondered, for example, why there is federal
jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to renew a copyright, 28 5 since
the statute has been read to adopt state principles of succession; and
the Supreme Court many years back denied federal jurisdiction to de280 E.g., American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
281 E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 879 (1821).
282 See Mishkin, The Federal"Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 157,
170-1 (1953).
283 Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state-court judgments in such cases was denied
in Miller's Executors v. Swann, 150 U.S. 132 (1898), and upheld in Standard Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 816 U.S. 481 (1942). District-court jurisdiction was denied in Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), and upheld in Smith v. Kansas City Title & T. Co.,
255 U.S. 180 (1921). Jurisdiction in habeas corpus was denied in McClain v. Wilson, 870
F.2d 369, 870 (9th Cir. 1966), and in Flores v. Beto, 374 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 887 U.S. 948 (1967). For further confusion see Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 378 U.S. 647
(1963), and Avco Corp. v. Machinists' Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), suggesting opposite
conclusions without adverting to the issue.
284 One commentator would distinguish between cases in which a state has created
additional remedial consequences based upon a pre-existing federal duty and those in
which it has extended the duty to new factual cases. Note, Supreme Court Review of
State Interpretations of Federal Law Incorporated By Reference, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 1498,
1502-3 (1953). The subtlety of this distinction is against it, and in either case the federal
government is indifferent to the outcome. There may be virtue in promoting uniformity
in cooperative state-federal programs based on a common standard (e.g., unemployment
compensation) by providing federal jurisdiction; but it seems better, as in the case of
federal incorporations, not to burden the federal courts with a lot of cases devoid of
federal interest until Congress provides for jurisdiction in the case of a particular program.
In the familiar Standard Oil case, supra note 283, one may be tempted to discern a
federal interest in avoiding taxation of government agencies; but this concern arises from
the proprietary position of the United States, not from the state's use of federal standards
for determining the tax, and it is protected by the truly federal constitutional limits on
intergovernmental taxation.
285 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). See the discussion of this case in
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915
(1965), and in Txrt. DRAFT No. 6, at 84.
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termine which of two claimants was entitled to receive a land patent
from the United States, because the statute provided that "local customs" were determinative. 2 6 Yet the adoption of state standards does
not demonstrate indifference to the outcome of a case. It is of some
concern to the national government who is entitled to vote for congressmen, despite the use of state law as a reference. 28 7 And when state law
is adopted purely for federal convenience, as in the old Conformity
Act respecting procedure, 28 8 it may be unfair to expect the states to
undertake the whole burden of litigation; the states do not have a burning interest in how federal courts are run.
Professor Cohen defends the refusal of jurisdiction in the landclaimant cases on the pragmatic ground that local issues are likely to
predominate, 28 9 but I think the difficulty of drawing lines and the
ultimate federal interest in determining who gets federal benefits
justify holding the case within the arising-under jurisdiction. Surely,
for example, the FELA plaintiff is not to be kept out of federal court
because her "widow" status is dependent upon state law. 290 To express

this in the statute would not be easy; though the Court has sometimes
been wrong on this matter in the past, I would leave it for the Court
to correct.
Another ambiguity in the present statute is the uncertainty whether
cases arising under federal common law come within the jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's unpersuasive Romero opinion, 291 which held
maritime common law outside federal-question jurisdiction because a
federal forum was already available in admiralty, failed to account for
the corresponding overlaps between admiralty and diversity and in
the case of maritime statutes; but it left open the question of section
1331 jurisdiction over other common-law cases. Rightly concluding that
federal common law requires the same vindication and uniformity
as do statutes, the ALI hopes the courts will uphold jurisdiction, but
288 Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 508 (1900).
287 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
288 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
289 Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"

Under FederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L. Rlv. 890, 906-7 (1967).
290 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
291 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See the
dispute over Romero's interpretation regarding suits for injunctions based on maritime
common law in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959),
rev'd, 362 U.S. 365 (1960), and Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir. 1960). Since the premise of Romero was the existence of an adequate remedy in admiralty, the inability of courts sitting in admiralty to give injunctions argues strongly for
jurisdiction. But Romero may have held the maritime common law was not a "law of
the United States."
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it refrains from proposing an amendment to this effect lest it raise
"questions about the continued applicability of existing case law the
authority of which it is intended to preserve." 292
The same objection is raised against making explicit the probable
requirement that the case arise under a law not limited to the District
of Columbia or to federal territories and possessions. 29 3 This limitation is a good one too, for essentially local matters belong in the
District of Columbia or territorial courts. Finally, the Reporters disclaim even any opinion on the unfortunate holding that an interstate
compact is not a federal "law" for jurisdictional purposes. 294 The
federal interest in uniform interpretation of a compact is strong, especially since the Court has made clear that federal law governs the
question; 295 the federal courts are ideally placed to arbitrate conflicting state positions respecting compacts; and there is a federal interest
in assuring that the limitations of congressional consent are respected.
I cannot see what deserving case law would be questioned by clarifying any of these ambiguities; the best argument against amending the
statute to reach cases "arising under the Constitution, treaties, statutes,
regulations, executive orders or agreements, and common law of the
United States not limited to the District of Columbia, territories or possessions, and under interstate compacts" is the esthetically displeasing
lack of simplicity. There is also the danger of excluding by negative
implication some overlooked type of federal law, such as the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 2 6 But since the lawyer needs to know the inclusions and exclusions, it might be better to encumber the statute with
those that can be reasonably expressed than to leave him to look for
relevant decisions.
3. Exclusive Jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction is normally concurrent with that of the states;
if neither party wants a federal forum, it is not forced upon the litigants. It is difficult to justify exceptions to this principle. Allowing
the state courts to protect their dockets by refusing jurisdiction is one
thing;29 7 depriving willing state courts of power to proceed when both
No. 6, at 86-87.
293 Id. at 85-86.
294 Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 109 (1938).
295 Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 (1959).
296 See Cleary v. Bolger, 871 U.S. 392, 414 n.3 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting), raising
the question whether the Rules were "civil rights statutes" within 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
297 See Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950) (forum non conveniens); but see Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 83,38-39 (1926), refusing to allow use of a
short state statute of limitation in a Jones Act case.
292 TENT. DRAFT
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parties desire a state adjudication is another. The divorce situation
presents a. strong case for exclusive jurisdiction because of the danger
that both parties and the foreign court may wish to subvert the properly
applicable law.298 But this example is atypical; the cases within federal
jurisdiction do not involve this problem.
Professor Wechsler some years ago argued for continued exclusive
federal jurisdiction over federal crimes on the ground that only in
federal courts could defendants be assured their constitutional rights
against the federal government. 299 But this problem could be cured
by allowing removal by the defendant who wants additional rights,
even if the recent expansion of the rights of state-court defendants
and the added fact that the federal government was prosecutor would
not assure adequate protection in state court. Professor Frankfurter's
long-ago suggestion that much essentially local federal criminal business
be transferred to the state courts3 0 has never been taken up; perhaps a
revision of the Judicial Code is not the best place to discuss it.
The complexity of antitrust cases is perhaps an indication that state
courts would not be overly anxious to take on the burden of adjudicating them, or at first overly competent to do so. Patent cases may be
similar in this regard, though the present narrow scope of exclusive jurisdiction leaves the state courts considerable scope to deal with patent
law. 30 1 The ALI's notion that in patent and copyright cases there is a
federal interest transcending that of the parties30 2 is unconvincing;
since nonparties would not be bound by a state decision, it is hard to
see how the monopoly could be undermined or extended by state
litigation. As for uniformity of decision, the desire for federal precedents does not forbid parties to arbitrate or to settle their disputes
without litigation; no more should it bar recourse to a possibly more
convenient and less costly state court.
Suits against the United States and for review of its administrative
agencies are authorized only in federal courts, and this is reasonable:
Since the United States could be expected to remove most suits brought
against it in the state courts, exclusive federal jurisdiction spares the
parties and the courts an extra round of filing and of court costs. In
298 See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict Of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and
Borax, 34 U. CH. L. REv. 26, 49-53 (1966).
299 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 219 (1948).
800 F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusiNEss oF THE SuPREMwE COURT 293 (1928).
301 See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897); Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 510-1 (1926).
802 TENT. DA r No. 6, at 89.
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bankruptcy cases the presence of multiple parties makes the danger of
state-court error both unusually likely and unusually serious.
I would limit the exclusive jurisdiction to criminal, bankruptcy, and
antitrust cases; to suits against the United States or for review of federal administrative agencies; and to certain maritime proceedings discussed below. 308
4. PendentJurisdiction
State-law issues are commonly adjudicated in federal courts, regardless of diverse citizenship, if they are part of a case arising under federal
law. The strength of the policy justifying this intrusion on state concerns varies according to the case, as Hart and Wechsler and the recent
article by Mr. Shakman have shown. 30 4 When, as in the National Bank's
contract case,3 05 only a part of the federal claim itself is based on
federal law, or when a federal defense is interposed to a state-created
cause of action, a federal trial court could not function at all if it could
not pass upon local issues. In interpleader cases the court could function if it left out of consideration claims created by state law, but the
risk of exposing a stakeholder to multiple liability argues strongly for
pendent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's decisions permitting a
plaintiff with a federal claim to join state-law claims arising out of the
same transaction 0 6 go a big step further, based entirely upon the savings in time and money of avoiding multiple trials on overlapping
evidence.
As I indicated in discussing the complete-diversity rule and its exceptions, 80 7 I have no difficulty in subordinating the claim of states'
rights in this sort of situation to what I consider a substantial economy
of resources, and I endorse the ALI's intention to codify the pendentjurisdiction doctrine in the broad form in which the Supreme Court
has recently defined it. 808 The old test of Hum v. Oursler,80 9 which
803 See text at notes 337-41 infra. The ALI commendably proposes to do away with
exclusive jurisdiction in a number of obscure situations, as well as under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964). See TENT. DR. r No. 6, at 5, 89-94,

§ 1311(b).
304 H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 804
(1953); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv.
262 (1968).
305 Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
806 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238

(1933).
807 See text at note 156 supra.
808 TENr. DRArr No. 6, at 10, § 1313(a).
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289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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required a distinction between separate "claims" and separate "causes
of action," was not easy to administer, and it forced the splitting of a
number of cases that might better have been consolidated from the
point of view of judicial economy.310 The 1948 attempt at codification3 11 was a failure; no one knew whether the reviser's test of a
312
"related" claim was meant to broaden or to preserve the Hum test,

and the apparent limitation of the doctrine to copyright, patent, and
trademark litigation made little sense in policy and less in precedent.
The statute has been largely ignored.
The Gibbs case gives the proper breadth to the doctrine, allowing
pendent jurisdiction whenever considerations of judicial economy justify consolidation. 313 The ALI captures the essence of this principle,
making it easily available to the harried practitioner in familiar language that lends itself to construction in light of the policy of avoiding
duplication of proof: State-law claims may be entertained if they "arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or
occurrences as the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim." The interpretive difficulties of this test, already utilized in the closely related
provision defining compulsory counterclaims in Rule 13(a), seem justified by the enormous burden of duplicate litigation that can be avoided
by pendent jurisdiction.
I would end the definition right there. The ALI feels the need to
add a complicating qualification: "if such a determination is necessary
in order to give effective relief on the federal claim or counterclaim
or if a substantial question of fact is common to the claims arising under
314 In the
State law and to the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim."
great mass of cases one or both of these conditions will be met by the
requirement that the federal and state claims arise from the same
transaction; the gain in specificity of tailoring jurisdiction to policy
by adding the ALI's qualification seems to me outweighed by its difficulties of application.
The ALI sensibly provides that when a case is removed to a state
31 5
court all claims unrelated to the federal claim are to be remanded.
310 E.g., in Hum itself, where the federal claim was for copyright infringement, a statelaw claim for theft of an uncopyrighted version of the same play was dismissed. See also
Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964).
311 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964).
312 Compare River Brand Rice Mills v. General Foods Corp., 334 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1964), with Powder Power Tool Corp. v. Powder Actuated Tool Co., 230 F.2d 409, 413
(7th Cir. 1956).
313 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
314 TENT. DRAFr No. 6, at 10, § 1513(a).
315 Id. at 10, § 1313(b).
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This is a logical corollary of the basic pendent-jurisdiction provision:
Judicial economy does not sanction depriving state courts of authority
over nondiverse claims not factually related to those in federal court.
The proposal for remand is related to that old bugaboo, the separateclaim-removal statute (section 1441(c)). The problem is what to do
about removal when a plaintiff joins claims under federal and state law
in a state court. The answer is easy enough: If the claims are related,
the whole case should be removable in order to assure correct interpretation of the federal right and to promote judicial economy; if the
claims are unrelated, the federal claim alone should be removable. Before the broadening of pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs it was not clear
that either of these goals could be reached under the general removal
statute, because removal was tied to original jurisdiction, and the
federal court might not have had original jurisdiction over the entire
action.3 18
Gibbs takes care of the related-claim case: If there is need for consolidation, there is pendent jurisdiction and the entire case is within
original federal cognizance. The ALI's remand proposal indirectly
solves the case of the unrelated claims, for it unmistakably implies that
removal is contemplated although the state-court case contains some elements outside original federal jurisdiction; and the ALI's revised federal-question provision makes clear that federal jurisdiction exists
whenever the complaint sets forth a substantial federal claim, without
regard to the presence of state claims. 317 Section 1441(c), which says so
much more than this, which was designed before the effective pendentjurisdiction doctrine of Gibbs, and which plays hob with the diversity
jurisdiction, is not needed.
The Institute resolves the dispute over whether extraterritorial federal process is effective on pendent state claims 318 by saying it is.319 This
answer is fully consistent with the policy underlying nationwide federal service in those situations in which it is authorized; if the plaintiff
is to be allowed to sue the defendant far from home, he should not be
discouraged from doing so, or forced to wage two lawsuits respecting
318 See Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of "Separate and
Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 HARv. L. REV. 428, 426 (1958).
317 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 5, § 1311(a). See also the removal provision, § 1312(a)(1), id.
at 6, which reinforces the conclusion by allowing removal of a "civil action" whenever
there is a "claim" within original federal cognizance.
318 Compare, e.g., Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 980-2 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), with Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 708, 705-6 (D. Mass. 1964).
See Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 11 Vim. L. Rxv. 56

(1965).
319 TENT. DR.AFT

No. 6, at 10, 119-20, § 1313(a).
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a single transaction, by being denied the right to make that process
effective as to related state claims. Moreover, since the defendant is
required to defend the federal claim in a distant forum, it is not likely
to be appreciably more inconvenient for him to face related state-law
claims there too,
My first caveat is based on the fact that state and constitutional limits
on personal jurisdiction express important choice-of-law considerations
as well as policies of convenience;3 20 care must be taken not to allow
pendent personal jurisdiction to cause a change in the applicable law
to the detriment of some interested state. Mechanical application of the
Klaxon rule 32 1-following the choice-of-law rules of the forum statewould do just that, without the justification of avoiding intrastate
forum-shopping, since only in the federal court is there nationwide service of process. If defendants are brought in who are beyond state
reach, the analogy of Van Dusen v. Barrack32 2 teaches that they should

be treated as if the suit had been brought in a state in which they could
have been sued. Unfortunately, in contrast to the transfer case, it is not
always clear where the suit would have been brought if there had been
no nationwide federal service; often there may be two or more available
forums. The best compromise between Erie policy and judicial economy
therefore seems to be, as the ALI suggests in interpleader, 323 to allow
the federal court to depart from state choice-of-law doctrine when that
to
is necessary to avoid injustice to a defendant not normally subject
324
suit in the forum state. The Reporters' commentary so proposes.

My second reservation respecting the relaxation of venue and personal-jurisdiction requirements for claims pendent to those subject to
nationwide process is that the relaxation should be confined to claims
among the original parties. Limitations on the place of trial reflect important policies of fairness and convenience in litigation; I do not think
the desirability of avoiding multiple trials justifies dragging to an
otherwise inappropriate forum parties not subject to nationwide pro325
cess on the original claim.

The ALI would make explicit the judicial rule that if the federal
claim is disposed of, the federal court may in its discretion dismiss
820 See D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Armh: Eight Yeqrs of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
321 Klaxon Co. y. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
322 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
323 See text at note 127 supra.
324 TENT. DRArr No. 6, at 120.
325 See the more general discussion of place of trial and additional parties in text at
note 444-6 infra.
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pendent state claims without adjudication.826 It is obvious that litigants
should not be allowed to impose upon the federal courts by appending
substantial state claims to frivolous federal ones, and that judicial
economy will not be served by pendent jurisdiction in such a case
because there is not going to be a federal trial at all. In part this problem is taken care of by the ALI's codification of the jurisdictional substantiality requirement; 327 claims dearly lacking merit will not even get
in the federal door, and there is nothing to which state claims can be
appended. The federal courts have also wisely refused, however, to hold
a separate tri al simply for state claims even when the pretrial dismissal
of the federal claim is on the merits instead of for lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in Gibbs suggested this rule might be an absolute one by saying "certainly" the state claims should be dismissed in
such a case; 3 28 but the force of this statement, which was not necessary
to the result, is weakened by the Court's describing the entire decision
respecting pendent jurisdiction as discretionary. I suppose discretion,
despite its uncertainty, is best in such a matter. The extent of the predismissal investment of federal resources in discovery and other pretrial
maneuvers will vary from case to case, as will the additional effort required to adjudicate the state claims; it would be wasteful, for example,
to throw them out without prejudice if they could be disposed of on
the merits before trial along with the federal claims. There may also be
problems with state limitation periods that expired while the federal
claim was pending.
The ALI's provision for discretionary refusal to adjudicate state
claims in removed cases necessitates a special section allowing immediate appellate review of the dismissed federal claim, with a stay of
the order remanding state claims pending appeal. 329 This is complicated
but sensible, because it avoids wasted efforts. The principle is clear and
its application will be easy; the frightening bulk of the provision is
deceptive.
In general, I heartily endorse the ALI's proposals regarding federalquestion jurisdiction. In particular, the suggested limitation of exclusive jurisdiction, the codification of pendent jurisdiction, and the
provisions for removal on the basis of federal defenses deserve prompt
congressional approval. My objections to the details of these sections
No. 6, at 10, § i313(c).
827 Id. at 5, § 1311(a).
S28 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
329 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 10-11, § 1313(d).
826 TENT. DRAFT
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are minor; I would gladly sacrifice them in order to see the general
improvements enacted.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

The Institute's modest emendations of the barnacled provisions for
maritime cases are among the very best of their proposals. First, the
ALI steps squarely into a controversy that Congress has unfortunately
left unsettled since 1789, providing expressly that "the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction does not include a claim merely because it arose
on navigable waters." 330 This means that jurisdiction and choice of law
respecting plane crashes, for example, can no longer be held to depend
upon the irrelevant question whether the wreckage is upon the earth or
the water;33 1 the admiralty jurisdiction and its attendant federal common law3 32 will henceforth be tailored to the needs of the shipping
business that are their universally acknowledged justification. 333 The
more ambitious extension of admiralty jurisdiction to cover the entire
aviation business-an extension clearly warranted by the precise
analogy between air and water commerce in terms of the policies underlying the jurisdiction 334-is not considered by the Reporters.
Apart from its partial renunciation of the blind locality test for torts,
the ALI does not enter the morass of irrational distinctions created by
judicial attempts to delineate which cases are "maritime," and for this
it is perhaps to be forgiven. An ideal statute would see to it that the locality test is no more a necessary than a sufficient condition in tort
cases; the belated Extension Act,335 which includes within the jurisdicId. at 19, § 1316(a).
331 See Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). Better decisions, rejecting jurisdiction in cases of swimmers and divers injured by striking submerged
objects or the bottom, are Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 965-6
(6th Cir. 1967), and McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
332 See generally D. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess,"
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 158. I agree the statute should not try to exempt pleasure boating, because of the difficulty in drafting to take account of such matters as collisions between
pleasure and commercial vessels. The issue seems better dealt with as a matter of choice
of law than as one of jurisdiction. See TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 137-8.
333 See, e.g., Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction:Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLua. L. REv.
259, 262 (1950); Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALI. L. Rav. 661,
665 (1963).
334 See D. CutouE, FEDERAL COURTS 405-9 (1968).
335 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964). Perhaps it was the inappropriate stowage of this provision
outside the Judicial Code that led the Reporters to overlook it. The incompleteness of
the Extension Act and the interpretive problems it creates (see D. CuRIa, FEDERAL
CouRTS 399-403), suggest that the Reporters' fear that such a revision might cause as
many problems as it would solve is not well founded. The statute should provide, in
words the Reporters reject, jurisdiction over "all ciaims arising out of any maritime
transaction or occurrence irrespective of where the claim arose or the damage or injury
occurred." TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 140-1.
830
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tion suits for shore damage caused by a vessel, ought itself to be extended. The well-known exclusions of contracts to build and to sell
ships3 86 ought to be explicitly eliminated. The statute ought to make
clear that the "admiralty court" has full power to give equitable, quasicontractual, or any other kind of relief necessary to do full justice between the parties; it is high time that Professor Morrison's unanswerable repudiation of the ancient and lingering limits on remedial powers
337
in section 1333 cases were enacted into law.

A second highly commendable proposal of the ALI is to restate the
confusing saving-to-suitors clause of section 1333, which gives the misleading impression that the admiralty jurisdiction is largely exclusive.
State courts, says the ALI in essentially codifying the existing decisional
law, shall have concurrent jurisdiction of maritime cases except for
limitation proceedings and actions in rem.338 The commentary makes
clear that the state courts will be permitted to entertain suits under the
Death on the High Seas Act, 33 9 although courts have frequently and
unjustifiably held federal jurisdiction exclusive.3 40 The change is a
good one, in line with the general policy that suitors not desiring a
federal forum should be permitted to forgo it. Limitations and in rem
proceedings present the only justifiable cases for exclusive jurisdiction
in maritime matters, apart from suits against the United States; both
336 See, e.g., The Francis McDonald, 254 U.S. 242 (1920) (construction); The Ada, 250
F. 194 (2d Cir. 1918) (sale). The Reporters admit the exclusion of shipbuilding is an
"anomaly" but find it "of little practical significance" since it is well known; those affected
"are able to safeguard their interests." TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 188. This is to say there
is no point in making the division of jurisdiction rational, and it comes close to saying
admiralty jurisdiction might just as well be dispensed with altogether. Amendment
would not require emulation of the British attempt to enumerate all maritime cases,
Administration of Justice Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § 1 (1956). I agree this would
invite trouble. All that is needed is to deal with the two most flagrant exceptions, with
perhaps a commentary suggesting the new inclusions are to be taken as a guide for
avoiding unnatural limitation of the general term "maritime." Jurisdiction should
reach "all claims arising from maritime transactions, including contracts for construction
or sale of vessels."
337 See Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 48 YAL.E LJ. 1 (1933). The
Reporters complacently assert that the problem has "apparently been cured" by the 1966
unification of civil and admiralty procedure. See TENT. DRAr No. 6, at 136-7, relying on
FEn. R. Crv. P. 1, 18, defining maritime actions to be "civil" and allowing joinder of
"legal, equitable," and "maritime" claims. Even if the courts are willing to buy this
persuasive argument (but see Fiddler, The Admiralty Practice in Montana and All That,
17 MAINE L. REv. 15, 25-26, 28, 88 (1965)), it provides only for relief ancillary to a request
for a remedy traditionally maritime; the problem remains whether the admiralty jurisdiction includes an action for injunction alone. See Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' Intl
Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
338 TENT. DRAFr No. 6, at 19, § 1316(b).
389 46 U.S.C. §§ 761 et seq. (1964); TrNT. DRArr No. 6, at 147-8.
840 E.g., Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 98-98 (NJ). Cal. 1954). Contra,
Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp., 24 Misc. 2d 1010, 204 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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typically include numerous claimants, so that the case isboth unusually,
difficult and nuisually impqrtant.
Less understandable is the In~titute's a~ceptance p9 4 e a law that
maritime cases brought in state court are not removable simply because
they are originally cognizable in admiralty.3 41 The present statute was
42
plainly designed without regard to the remoyal of maritime cases,3
but the federal interest in providing a forum for the defendant seems
just as great as in any other cases w~thin the original federal jurisdiction. Only in the commentary, and Nwithout giving any reasons, does
the ALI reveal that it means to perpetuate the Romer holding that
343
cases under the general maritime law are not federal-question cases.
*Thus,the Institute means to preserve the absurd rule that removal of
maritime cases isallowed only if the parties are diverse or the case is
based on a federal statute. I would not give the plaintiff in a m4ritime
case a final power to choose a state forum except in the unusual case,
such as those under the Jones At,in which there is reason to assert a
special concern, for the convenienpe of an especially needy clas of
34
plaintiffs. 4
The best argument I have seen against allowing remqyal into 1dmiralty is that removal woul4 cIfeat the plaintiff's option to secure a
trial by jury, which was the central purppse of the dause saving cpmmon-law remedies.3 4u Removal on the basis of diversity or a federal
statute, presently allowed, is consistent with this policy (but not with
diversity
the asserted policy of allowing choice of a state forum),
federal-question cases are tried "at law." And it isinregard to trial
by jury that the Institute makes its most singular and forward-lopking
contribution to maritime law, authorizing jury trial on request of
and

341 TENT. DRArr No. 6, at 20, 154, § 1317(a). See Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 35, 371-2 (1959) (dictum). A few courts have allowed removal.
See, e.g., Davis v. Matson Nay. Co., 143 F. Supp. 5a7 (N.D. Cal. 1956), and the modified
positiqn of the same judge in the Crawford case, infra note 342.
342 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964), construed in Crawford v. East Asiatic Co., 156 F.
Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1957), to forbid removal on the basis of admiralty alone if any
defendant resided in the forum state.
343 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See
DRAA
No. 6, at 154.
344 The Institute's § 1312(b)(3), T N;r. DRAFT No. 6, at 7, would preserye the Jnnes
Act's prohibition of removal because of the "deliberately considered choice of Congress,"
id. at 109. The policies underlying this choice, the Reporters note, "seem equally applicable" to other maritime personal-injiry actions, see id. at 154-5, yet the @aft does pot
forbid their removal on diversity grounds. This oversight should be corrected, at least
as to seamen's actions, which may be special. See the confusion engendered by joinder of
Jones Act and other seamen's claims in state court in Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp.,
193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952), discussed in D. CuRa, FEDERAL CouRTs 364-5 (1968).
345 See Note, Removal o4dmiralty,69 YAri L.J. 442, 451 (1960).
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any party, even though the basis of jurisdiction is admiralty, of all
3 46
claims for damages from personal injury or death.
This provision is brilliant. It may be the first attempt in the history
of American law to base the right to a jury upon considerations of its
appropriateness instead of on hollow historical accident. It builds upon
the excellent suggestion made some years ago by Professor Charles
Black that juries are out of their depth in complex commercial cases
but vitally useful in accident litigation where the "estimation of the
intangible but real elements of damage ... is very much a matter of
lay feeling."3 47 It provides a solution for the argument that removal
into admiralty would deprive the plaintiff of his jury: Removal would
do this only when the case would be better tried without one.
It would be good if the ALI's functional approach could be extended
to the troublesome jury problems on the "law side" of the court, which
now require a tedious and irrelevant investigation into the division of
responsibility between law and equity in eighteenth-century England; 348
but the Seventh Amendment would get in the way unless rationalization took the form of extension rather than contraction of jury trial
in every instance. Meanwhile the Institute is very much to be applauded
for its advanced contribution to rationality in the mode of trying maritime cases. Indeed I think it would be wise to go further and to provide
that the admiralty jurisdiction is the sole basis of federal power over
maritime cases. This would allow refusal of a jury in maritime cases not
involving personal injury regardless of the plaintiff's designation of his
claim. Surely the existence of diverse citizenship has nothing to do
with whether there ought to be a trial by jury.
Three cheers for the Institute's maritime proposals. The provisions
respecting jury trial, the locality rule in torts, and the jurisdiction of
state courts should be enacted at once, and additional corrections
should follow.
UNITED STATES AS PARTY

Sovereign immunity is the most interesting and controversial question in federal-government litigation, but the ALI is probably wise not
to deal with it in a general overhaul of the law of jurisdiction. The
bulk of the jurisdiction study is concerned with the issue of where a
lawsuit should be tried; immunity, while often considered "jurisdic346 TmT.DRAFr No. 6, at 22, § 1319. The exception for limitation proceedings is unfortunately to be preserved, see id. at 162-3.
847 Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction:Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 259, 278

(1950).
348 See Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961).
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tional" in many of its aspects, determines the quite distinct issue of
whether the government can be made to respond at all. Some day Congress should eliminate the irrational, inequitable exceptions to governmental tort liability; 49 consolidate the ragged and inconsistent statutes
consenting to suit; 350 abolish the untrusting and inconvenient requirement that government-contract actions for more than $10,000 must be
brought in the Court of Claims3 51 and the provision for direct Supreme
Court review of that court, 52 which burdens the Supreme Court with
insignificant cases or deprives the litigant of all review; and make a
more rational and more liberal reconciliation of individual protection
and government elbow-room in suits to enjoin federal officers than
53 3
that established by the benighted Larson decision and its sequels.
But all these matters are somewhat tangential to the central task of
deciding which cases belong in federal rather than in state court, and
the ALI is justified in not holding up one important job while pursuing another.
The Institute does essay two minor alterations in this field, raising
the maximum amount in district-court Tucker Act cases from $10,000
to $50,000354 (a small step in the right direction) and making an explicit provision regarding the none-too-clear right of a defendant to
counterclaim when sued by the United States. The proposal is a conservative one; it would allow any counterclaim that could have been
brought in a district court to begin with, or any related counterclaim
that could have been brought in any court of the United States, relaxing slightly the monopoly of the Court of Claims. But immunity itself
is not to be relaxed beyond the already established ability to set off
549

See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).

350 See e.g., Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158 (1966), and the discussion in D. CuRRiE, FEDmEAL CouRs 458-67 (1968).
351 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1964).

28 U.S.C. § 1255 (1964).
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-2 (1949); Malone
v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). As stated in Mr.
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Larson, 337 U.S. at 705, there may be something to be
said for protection against suits to obtain Government property; but the majority opinion
and both the Malone and Dugan decisions rested on the unjustifiable and unworkable
distinction between official acts in violation of statute and those merely illegal. See the
admirable proposal of Professor Wechsler to abolish immunity except when the judgment runs against the United States as such-making clear, of course, that courts may not
order an officer to cough up property owned by the United States. Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 222-3
(1948).
354 TENT. DsArr No. 6, at 25, § 1322(a)(1).
352
S53
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related claims against the government's recovery: "[N]o affirmative
3 55
judgment may be given against the plaintiff on such a claim."
This compromise should appease nobody; it relies on the economically exaggerated distinction between out-of-pocket losses and lost receipts, a distinction that can scarcely be of significance to the operations of the securely solvent government of the United States. There
may be wrongs that the government should be permitted to perpetuate
with impunity; if so, it should be irrelevant that the United States has
a claim against the victim for an equal or larger amount. On the other
hand, if it appears unfair for the government to play both sides of the
street by suing and refusing to be sued, counterclaims should be allowed without regard to whether they reduce the government's winnings or result in a judgment against the United States.
The Institute preserves the present statutes pertaining to mandamus
against federal officers,3 56 jurisdiction over federal corporations, 357 and
removal of state-court actions against federal officers, 358 providing specially for venue and change of venue in government litigation3 59 and
leaving untouched the provision for district-court review of ICC orders. 360 There is no excuse for retaining this obsolete departure from
court-of-appeals review in administrative cases, and especially no justification for the burdens of convening a special three-judge court and of
mandatory direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The ALI excuses its
inattention to this problem by noting that the Commission and the
361 Okay.
Judicial Conference are presently working on it.
The provision for removal by federal officers, while slightly changed
355 Id. at 24, § 1321(b). See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940), and the ambiguities discussed in H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, TiE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
Syvsm 1154-8 (1953).
356 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 26, § 1323(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), finally enacted in
1962 to remedy a shocking gap erroneously based upon M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 504 (1813), which had relied on the absence of a grant of federal-question jurisdiction. This statute removes neither sovereign immunity nor the limitation of mandamus
to actions not "discretionary," see Smith v. United States, 333 F.2d 70, 72 (10th Cir. 1964);
clarity and simplicity might be served, as well as the case for mandamus against state
or local officials improved, by substituting a reference to mandamus in the general federalquestion provision for the separate section proposed by the ALL.
357 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 27, § 1324(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
358 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 27, § 1323(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1964).
359 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 29-32, §§ 1326-27. The commentary explains, id. at 31, 33,
that these provisions are generally similar to those for federal-questions or diversity cases,
see text at notes 407-66 infra, except that in government cases venue is proper in the state
where all plaintiffs, other than the United States, reside.
360 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 28, § 1325; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1336, 2325 (1964).
361 See TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 186, 247.
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in ivbrding, i' not described aIs changing the law, althoigh a recent
court-of-appeals decision casts doubt on the protective sufficiency 6f the
existing statute by tonstruifig it more narrowly than the substantive
federal law restricting damage's against federal officers.362 The applropriateriess of this juriisdiction to assure the ffective functioning of the
federal government itself is evident,s63 and the scope of removal should
encompass every substantial claim of federal privilege. The ALI's proposed removl iii federal-defense cases fails to meet this need, because
it is limited by the inadvisable jurisdicti6nal amount; 3 4 and further
study should be given to the question whether state hostility to federal
programs is such as to justify removal of claims against federal officers
even when fed'eral defenses are not at stake.
The Institute has nothifig to say about the neither settled nor satisfactory state of the law respctirig the jurisdiction of state courts over
federal officers. Without rhyme or reason the Supreme Court has allowed state courts to entertain criiiihal, replevin, and damage suits
against federal officers, but not mandaius or habeas corpus;36 5 the possibility of ain injunction is cloudy.366 Obviously such limitations as
sovereign immunity bar state as well as federal proceedings, but whether
the integrity of federal operations requires additional restrictions on
state power over federal officers is less clear. The subject ought to be
considered.
I am left with the feeling that since the ALI was not prepared to
undertake a thorough consideration of the law respecting federal-government litigation it would have been better advised to leave the subject alone. Its half-baked efforts in this regard make little significant
contribution and are likely to deflect attention in the future from the
many and serious issues that are not effectively resolved by the draft.
THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
Ever since the 1789 judiciary Act, which imposed a $500 minimum
iii diversitr tases,367 access to the federal courts in certain cases has been
limited to cases involving a more or less substantial money value. Both
362 Morgan v. Willingham, 883 F.2d 139, 141-2 (10th Cir..1967).
363 See Bradford v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1960).
364 TENT. DRAFr No. 6, at,6, § 1312(a)(2).
365 United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S: 1 (1906) (criminal); Tarble's Cqse,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.), 97 (1872) (habeas); Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 292 (1852)
(damages); M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604-5 (1821) (mandamus); Slocum
v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1817) (replevin).
366 See Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin F'ederal Officers, 73 YALE LJ.
1385 (1964).
367 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.

1969]

Federal Jurisdiction

the general diversity and the general federal-question provisions today
require more than $10,000 in controversy, 368 in order, according to the
Senate Report on the 1958 bill that raised the amount from $3,000,
not to "fritter away" the resources of the federal courts "in the trial of
petty controversies."36 9
Discrimination against litigants with "only" $10,000 at stake is not
without its unsavory connotations: The amount is high enough to
realize the Senate Committee's fears of turning the federal courts into
tribunals "of big business," except for accident cases, and to suggest an
indifference to protecting the rights of the common man. On the other
hand, if the federal courts are too busy to handle all diversity and federal-question cases, it makes sense to exclude those in which state-court
error or prejudice will do the least damage, and money may be as good
a gauge of damage as we can practicably apply.37 0 Alternative ways to
deal with the problem of congestion include the appointment of additional federal judges371 and the exclusion of particular classes of cases,
regardless of amount, in which there is relatively little need for a federal forum, an unusually high burden of litigation, or an especially
3 72
potent state interest.
The ALI does in part embrace the last alternative; in addition to
approving and extending federal doctrines requiring refusal to interfere without special warrant with state taxation or regulation, it proposes to exclude federal courts from original as well as removal jurisdiction in workmen's-compensation cases arising under state law. These
exceptions will be discussed below.37 3 But the Institute proposes to
retain the $10,000 minimum in diversity cases while abolishing it in
cases arising under federal law.37 4
The justification for the difference is in part the fact that existing
statutes make numerous exceptions to the amount requirement in federal-question cases now, leaving the amount required, according to the
Senate Committee in 1958, only in suits challenging the validity of
state statutes and in personal-injury suits brought by seamen under the
Jones Act.3 75 But many attacks upon state statutes come within section
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1964).
369 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
870 See TENr. DRAFT No. 6, at 79.
371 See the vehement objection to such a notion in Frankfurter, Distribution of Judi368

cial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 515-6 (1928).
872 See Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.AJ. 383,
384 (1960), making particular reference to personal-injury diversity cases.
073

See text at notes 505-10 infra.

374 See OrricuL DaRA-r, pt. I, at 8, § 1301(a) (diversity); TrEr. DRAFT No. 6, at 5,
J 1311(a) (federal question).
875 S. R a'. No. 1830, 85th Cong., ga Sm., 6 (1958).
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1343(3), which dispenses with the minimum amount in suits against
state officers for deprivation of "any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution" or by any federal law providing for equal
rights; 376 and the Jones Act, even if it does not itself confer jurisdiction
without regard to amount,3 77 will very likely be held a law "regulating
commerce" within section 1337,378 which also dispenses with the re-

quirement. In any event, the Jones Act plaintiff can get into federal
court with a small case simply by labeling his papers "Admiralty," for
there has never been a jurisdictional-amount requirement in section
1333 or its predecessors.
The lack of reason behind the patchwork pattern of exceptions, the
fact that the present requirement is "largely illusory," 379 and the difficulty of determining which cases require the amount and which do
not, amply support the Institute's decision to unify the law in all
federal-question cases. The further decision to accomplish unification
by abolishing rather than by extending the amount requirement accords very well with the principle that the federal courts ought to be
the principal enforcers of federal rights; to force small claims into
state courts, the Reporters say, "would smack too much of regarding
3....
30 And this solution elimithe state courts as inferior tribunals
nates the often very difficult process of determining how much is in
fact in controversy in the case at bar.
The diversity draft does not attempt to defend its retention of the
jurisdictional amount. The federal-question draft, observing the apparent contradiction, comes to the rescue without committing itself on
the other draft: "[W]here parties are relying entirely on state law, it is
not inappropriate to require the states to provide a forum for cases
involving a small amount." 3 81 The difference apparently comes not in
differential need for a federal forum but in the degree of undesirability
of requiring state courts to exercise small-claim jurisdiction, and in
376 For the undeservedly narrow construction given this statute and the Fifth Circuit's
recently abandoned efforts at correction, see Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (1967); D. CUtRRnE, FEDRmAL CouRTs 426-30 (1968).
377 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
378 See Imm v. Union R.R., 289 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1961) (FELA within § 1337); Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 5 (1946) (Jones Act supported by commerce power);
Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952) (FELA removal bar incorporated by Jones Act).
379 TFiNT. DRAFT No. 4, at 202. However, the occasional omissions may cause unjustified
hardship. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), where in the excitement over standing the Court overlooked the problem of amount in a suit to enjoin a federal officer from
disbursing money in alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.
380 TtNT. DRAFT No. 6, at 79.
381 Id.
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these terms the source of the governing law is indeed relevant. Whether
this difference justifies the distinction, however, is another matter.
Ascertaining the amount in controversy is no mean trick. In damage
actions the requirement is virtually ineffective to keep out small claims;
the amount at stake is whatever the plaintiff claims, if there is a possibility the jury will award it, and the courts are understandably reluctant to investigate the merits deeply enough to determine whether
there is a "legal certainty" that the amount claimed cannot be recovered
or whether it was claimed in bad faith.382 Provisions for denying and
imposing costs when recovery falls short of the claim, the ALI tells us,
have not proved very effective to deter inflated claims; 383 to enforce
the provisions rigidly, moreover, would hardly be fair to the honest
plaintiff whose case has been compromised by the jury.
When relief other than damages is sought the plaintiff's allegation is
not so conclusive, for the amount depends upon objective facts; unfortunately they do not always lend themselves to valuation. The impossibility of putting a money value on free speech, for example, may
have had much to do with the statutory dispensation of the minimum
in many constitutional cases; 38 4 constitutional rights against the United
States, however, and nonconstitutional rights such as adoption, custody,
and divorce, are equally immeasurable, and no special provision is made
38
for such cases.
Short of impossibility there are difficult valuation problems when,
for example, an injunction is sought. It is pretty well and sensibly
settled that the amount involved is the minimum cost to a party of losing his case; one cannot contend, for instance, that his entire $1,000,000
business is at stake when he could preserve it by buying a contested $50
license.38 6 But it is not always easy to determine the actual cost of complying, say, with a regulatory statute;38 7 and for some unknown reason
382 See, e.g., Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Society, 820 U.S. 238 (1943), holding the

then $3000 requirement met in an action asking $200,000 for fraud relating to the plaintiff's investment of $200 in a policy worth no more than $1000, although punitive damages
were required to "bear proportion" to the injury. Some courts are willing to dismiss when
on the facts a verdict exceeding the minimum would have to be set aside. E.g., Anthony
v. United Ins. Co., 240 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.S.C. 1965). Contra, e.g., Deutsch v. Hewes Street
Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1966).
383 OFFICIAL DRarT, pt. I, at 64-65, discussing the present 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1332(b)
(1964). The provision is to be retained, however, "because its presence may have had some
benefit and because its repeal might convey an unfortunate impression." See id. at 9,
§ 1301(d).
384 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 529 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring).
385 See Note, Determination of Federal JurisdictionalAmount in Suits on Unliquidated
Claims, 64 MICH. L. Rlv. 930, 932 n.10 (1966).
386 See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269 (1934).
387 See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
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it has remained unclear to this day whether the value to the plaintiff
or to th defendant is the critical fact. 8 It hatters little in terms of
jurisdictional policy which of these ast 'two positions is adopted, but
the uncertainty fuither complicates the jurisdictional questioi. When
installment payments are hi issue, the question is likely to depend upon
state law as to the immediate recoverability of contingent future
sums,3 8 9 a matter likely to be 'neither very clear nor very relevant to
whether the case belongs in federal court.
Aggregation of claims presents further problems. The general rule
is often said to be that a single plaintiff may aggregate any claims he
has against a single defendant, 3 0 fegardless of whether the claims are
related-:-an issue relevant to judicial convenience-or whether any
single claim meets the requirement. Ignorihg these differences is probably a good idea, since it simplifies the determination without any
very serious impaiiment of jurisdictional policy. The worst that can
happen by all6wing such aggregation is that a federal court may be
required to litigate a few small clainis that are after all diverse or federal. Counterclaims pose special problems all their own.3bi
The law respecting aggregation in multi-party cases, however, is both
less liberal ahd less kimple; the difference is probably explicable in
terms 0f the far greater risk of imposition of small and unrelated
claims upon the federal courts when multiple parties are involved. It
is said that claims by more than one plaintiff or against more than one
defendant may be aggregated only it the parties have a "common undivided ihiterest" arid a "single titlt or right" is involved. 39 2 There is a
388 See Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S.
121, 125 (1915), upholding jurisdiction although the defendant could havd removed his
offending poles and wires for $500 because the alleged damage to the plaintiff exceeded
$3000; Mississippi '& lo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1863), upholding
jurisdiction to remove a bridge without regard to the extent of harm to the plaintiff;
Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W. Ry. Co., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (M10tho. 1940); "mhe test .
is
the pecumary result to either party which the judgmeit would direcily produce." The
possibility that the apparent discrepancy between value to plaintiffs and to defendants
is illusory', se'e Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw 9- ECoN. 1 (1960), has not
k66inid its way to the ourts.
389 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. . Flowers, 330 U.S. 464, 467-8 (1947) (workmen's
compensation). Cf. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270-1 (1934), disallowing capitalization of
an annual tax sought to be enjoined and making rather lne distinctions.
390 See, e.g., H.M. HART & H. WEcasEAa, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
Ms. SYSTaM
997 (1953). A suggestive case is Pearson v. National Soc. of Public Accountants,'200 F.2d
897 (5th Cir. 1953).
391 Counterclaims apparently may be anticipated, as federal defenses may not, by
piaintiffs sekiig federal access without sufficient grounds of their own. Horton v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961). For additional counterclaim problems, see
D. CutRm, FEDERAL COURTS 439-40 (1968).
392 See Thomsosi v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942); C. WRIGiT, FEDERAL COtuTs 102

(1963).
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dispute between circuits as to the effect of recent amendments to the
Civil Rules upon the doctrine that claims may be aggregated in class
actions only if the class is a "true" one;3

6

3

there even are decisions re-

fusing pendent jurisdiction over small related claims in multiple-party
cases when the principal claim exceeds the jurisdictional amount, 394
despite the analogy to state-law claims in federal-question cases395 and
despite the policy of avoiding multiple litigation of a single controversy.
The ALI proposes to do nothing about this tangle except to make it
more impenetrable by allowing pendent jurisdiction over claims arising
from the same transaction as an action already in federal court and
brought by or on behalf of "any member of ... [the plaintiff's] family
living in the same household" against the same defendant. 39 The narrowness of this provision has nothing to recommend it; the same judicial economy can be had regardless of family ties or place of abode.
The Reporters' lame excuse is that relatives living together may have
the same lawyer; 397 so, however, may others, and the provision is not
well tailored to this not very material coincidence. The difficulties of
construction are patent and horrid: Does "family" include third cousins? Illegitimate, adopted; or step-children? In-laws? Does "living in
the same household" include Grandma, who has spent the past three
years in the laundry room while voting back home in Appalachia?
Junior, who is in Vietnam or in Leavenworth? A married son in the
coach house?398 And why, oh why, does it matter whether he has bought
the house next door instead?
Although a cataloguing of the problem areas may exaggerate their
numerical importance, it seems clear that the amount requirement,
designed to keep litigation out of federal courts, has imposed a considerable burden of litigation to determine its contours, litigation that
contributes nothing to the ultimate decision of the lawsuit and that
drains away resources in a very unproductive manner. I should prefer
to see the minimum amount abolished across the board because it is
893 Jurisdiction was upheld in
and denied in Snyder v. Harris,
394 E.g., Diana v. Canada Dry
v. American Chain & Cable Co.,

Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968),
390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968).
Corp., 189 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Pa. 1960). Contra, Wilson
364 F.2d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 1966).

395 See text at notes 303-29 supra.
396 OFFicAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 9-10, § 1301(e).
397 Id. at 65.
398 "It is believed that drawing the line at this point furnishes a standard that will

be simple to apply ....
similar terminology has commonly been used in insurance
policies and has frequently been construed by the courts." Id. at 66 n.12.
Moreover, what is the relevant time ,for determining whether the plaintiffs are members
of the same family, living together? What is the effect of a marriage, a divorce, or a
shipping out between the time of the transaction and the day suit is filed? Judging from

the decisions determining citizenship under past diversity statutes, see text at notes 87-93
supra, the test is the time of suit, but this invites manufactured residence.
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burdensome, inequitable, and in large part ineffective. Retention of
the amount, moreover, adds still another straw to the mistreated camel;
it makes administration of the debatable diversity jurisdiction, which
is on shaky enough ground to begin with, that much more complicated
and offensive.
RAiSING OBJECTIONS TO JURISDIcrION

Since the beginning, federal courts have indulged in the expensive
habit of investigating the existence of jurisdiction on their own and at
any stage of the proceedings, even overlooking garden-variety estoppel
to permit objections to be raised by the disappointed suitor who invoked
the jurisdiction and lost at trial.399 Recent scholarship has raised doubts
that the practice of the courts was ever quite so atrocious as their language would suggest,400 but the books contain ample evidence of cases
that reached the Supreme Court before anybody ever noticed the defect
that caused dismissal. The excuse for this sort of thing is apparently
the truism that limitations on federal jurisdiction often serve to protect
state rights and not the interests of the litigants; for this reason, and
in order to protect the federal courts from the burden of litigating
cases that do not belong there, the parties cannot be allowed to confer
jurisdiction by failure to object to its absence.
Adequate protection against imposition on the federal courts of cases
that should have been brought in the state, however, requires in general only that the federal judge be able to notice a lack of jurisdiction
on his own initiative at the pleading stage. The marginal gain in terms
of jurisdictional purity from leaving the issue open even on appeal
cannot justify the waste of time and money caused by throwing a case
out after it has been tried. A most glaring abuse of the principle that
jurisdiction can always be examined is the familiar decision in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, in which the Supreme Court threw
out for want of federal-question jurisdiction a case in which two federal
questions had been argued and decided below-because there was no
federal issue properly in the case when the complaint was filed. 401
The ALI wisely proposes to eliminate this "fetish . . . inconsistent
with sound judicial administration": 40 2 After trial begins, federal juris399 E.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
400 Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter jurisdiction
Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. Rav. 491, 507-21 (1967). And see the refreshing invocation of estoppel, defended even on precedential grounds by Professor Dobbs, in Di
Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960).
401 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
402 OFFcIAxL DRAFT, pt. I, at 106.
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diction is not to be questioned for the first time unless there is new
evidence or a change in law, "collusion or connivance," or the Constitution requires that the defect be noticed.40 3 Professor Dobbs considers
this provision at once too narrow and too broad. It allows wasteful
consideration of jurisdictional issues long after commencement of the
suit, so long as trial has not begun, and it precludes later consideration of jurisdictional issues that may be truly important. 4 4 I know of
no limits on federal civil jurisdiction so important that they must be
allowed to disrupt a trial already begun, if there was an opportunity
to consider them before; nor do I think there is any constitutional
compulsion, as the ALI overcautiously fears, to ignore the ordinary
principles of judicial efficiency that foreclose issues not timely raised. 40 5
Recent decisions commendably relaxing finality in habeas corpus
cases 40 6 rest on the high value of enforcing such important safeguards
as the prohibition of involuntary confessions; no such overpowering
policy requires assurance that no cases are tried in federal courts in
the absence of complete diversity.
There is merit to Professor Dobbs's suggestion that the inquiry into
jurisdiction be cut off earlier than the ALI proposes, perhaps thirty
days after the answer is filed; and I have reservations about the ALI's
permitting indefinite attack on the basis of "collusion or connivance."
Which court the case is tried in, as I have been saying throughout this
paper, is just not terribly important in most cases. But I heartily endorse the ALI's proposal respecting the foreclosure of jurisdictional
issues, because it is a bold stroke that will eliminate a great deal of
inefficiency and waste, and because it draws the necessary lines at quite
acceptable places.
VENUE AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION

As in the case of the jurisdictional amount, the Reporters for the
diversity draft and those for the federal-question draft have taken opposite positions regarding the place of trial in federal courts. Once
again the compliant membership of the Institute has gone along with
both proposals. Janus would have been proud.
For many long and unthinking years the federal courts have been
403 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 57-58, § 1386.
404 Dobbs, supra note 400, 51 MINN. L. REv. at 527.
405 Cf. M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1825); Durfee v. Duke, 375
U.S. 106 (1963), refusing to permit collateral attack on a judgment for lack of jurisdiction. See OFFIc L DRAFr, pt. I, at 108-10.
405 E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Brown

v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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encumbered by two distinct requirements for locating the appropriate
place for trying federal-court cases: p~esonaj jurisdition and veue.
Both, as the Supreme Ppurt has noted, are based in some part on
litigational convenience.497 In state cpurts the two concepts servo 4if-

ferent purposes: Personal jurisdiction determines whether it is appropriate to try the. case in tlie state at all, while venue determines the
best place within the state. But there is no such justifc tion for the
dual requirement in fe.deral court§ except in the relatively rare, cases
with international complications, an4 the ual stapdard is a burden to
administer. Moreover, the Federal Rules leave personal jurisdiction almost entirely to state law,4 08 and this disuniform, often inadequate
practice is toaly withput justification when federal rights are at stake.
Like a breath of fresh air, the ALI proposes a single test for the place
of trial in fedeal-questiq cases; Natiqnwide serice is to be allowed,
but suit may usually be brought only where "a substantial part" of the
events or property in suit occurred or is situated, or in the state where
all defendants reside. 40 9
In essence this propqsal adopts for, federal-question cases the principle
behind the modern crqp of long-arm statutes, 410 modifying the cqmTnq-lalv preference for making plaintiffs trayel by permitting suit

where te case arose. The "substantial part" language will doubtless
give rise to somq litigation, but its eyident intention is to avoid the
litigation-breeding apd tgc4nicality-inviting test§ of where a tort was
committed or a contract made;4 1 the 4LI's more general form is
412
preferable.
However, the unexplained clause permitting suit where '"a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated" con407 See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953) (venue); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-7 (1945) (personal jurisdiction).
'408 FE. R. Civ. P. 4. There are a few narrow provisions for nationwide service, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1964) (interpleader); 15 U.S.C. § §0a-43 (Investment Co. Act).
DRAFr No. 6, at 12-13, § 1314.
400 TE Trr.
410 See D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL.L.F. 533.
411 See id., 1963 U. ILL. L.F. at 544-5, s54-5, 572-3, 577-9.
412 The Institute overlooks (except in interpleader and dispersed-party cases, see
4
OFFICIAL DRAFT, "t. I, at 38-39, 45, §§ 23 4(a), 2361(a)) "the desirability-of providing longarm service upon parties outside the United States in cases arising here. This principle,
accepted by every state in its nonresident-motorist statute, recently generalized by most
states into a general long-arm statute, and approved by the Supreme Court, serves to
assure the effectuation of substantive forum policies and to remove the burden of litigation travel from the plaintiff injured in his own home town by a peripatetic outsider.
See R. CRAMTON & D. CuRmRE, CoNFLicr oF LAvs 477-9 (1968), and authorities cited;
It ought to be fully adopted
McGee v. International
cases.Life Ins. Co., 355 US. g20 (1957).
for federal-uestion
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tains the potential for considerable unfairness. If the proposal embodies
the outmoded and unclear distinction between actions in rem and in
personam, it will be difficult to administer and out of step with modern
jurisdictional thought. 13 If it means the mere presence of property in
the district authorizes suit there on any claim arising out of the ownership or use of that property anywhere, it bears little relation to the
policies relevant to choosing the appropriate forum. If it preserves the
unfair practice of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over claims unrelated to
the forum district on attachment of property situated there, it ought to
41 4
be replaced by its opposite at once.
When all defendants reside in one state, the ALI allows the plaintiff
a choice of forum. 415 But it rejects the suggestion that suit should be
permitted wherever one defendant resides if others live outside the
state, because "what is convenient for one defendant will be inconvenient for the other defendant. 41 6 This is true enough, and hardship
to the plaintiff in such cases is avoided by allowing suit wherever a
substantial part of the events occurred.
When the events all took place outside the country, however, the
ALI subordinates the defendant's convenience to the desirability of
providing some forum: "No federal question case should be denied a
federal forum because of restrictive rules of venue or process," so suit
may be brought wherever "any defendant may be found." 417 This provision embodies the vice of the discredited rule allowing mere service
within the jurisdiction to create authority to try causes of action unrelated to the place of forum; 418 it even extends the unfairness of this
rule by allowing several defendants found anywhere in the country to
be dragged to a district in which only one of them has been served.
Moreover, when the facts have all occurred outside the United States
the choice of forum may very well affect the choice of law; to allow suit
418 See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 241,
277.
414 See FED. R. Cav. P. 4(e), allowing use of state foreign-attachment laws; R. CRAxxroN
& D. CUmRE, CoNFUC'r OF LAWS 528-33 (1968), criticizing the practice.

415 The preservation of the existing test of residence rather than of citizenship (see
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. II, 1967)) perpetrates the likelihood of separate tests for de-

termining diversity and for determining venue, see Townsend v. Bucyrus-Erie Corp., 144
F.2d 106, 108-9 (10th Cir. 1944). Contra, Koons v. Kaiser, 91 F. Supp. 511, 517 (S.D.N.Y.

1950); 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 1483-4 (2d ed. 1964), but the disparity corresponds
to the different policies that underlie the two decisions: Venue is based upon litigation
convenience, while diversity seeks to protect against prejudice. Domicile (see text at notes
53-61 supra) is an obviously inappropriate test of the former; if symmetry demands a

change, both inquiries should turn on residence.
416 TENT. DRAFT" No. 6, at 127.

417 Id. at 12, 126, § 1314(a)(3).
418 See D. Currie, supra note 410, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. at 58 -4.
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in the United States because of physical presence in the jurisdiction
unrelated to the facts in suit may subject the defendant not only to
the costs of litigating in an inconvenient forum but also to the application of American law in a case he had reason to believe would be
governed by foreign law. If the facts did not happen in this country,
and if one or more defendants reside abroad, the plaintiff should be
41 9
left to sue elsewhere.
Corporations and associations, now regarded for venue purposes as
residents of every district in which they do business, 420 are to be considered residents under the ALI proposal only of the district of their
principal place of business and, in the case of a corporation, of each
district in every state of incorporation. 421 The purpose of this restriction is to avoid suits against organizations in inconvenient districts
unrelated to the cause of action; as the commentary points out, suit
422
may be brought where the facts occurred without regard to residence.
Unfortunately, this commendable goal is to be attained only at the
price of a tedious inquiry into principal places of business. 423 Since the
plaintiff is free to sue where the acts occurred and in the corporation's
charter state, I don't think the advantages of allowing one additional
forum are sufficient to warrant imposing the burden of threshold litigation on the courts to determine an organization's principal place of
business. Suit should be allowed only in the charter state of any association, incorporated or not, and where a substantial part of the events
occurred.
One magnificent contribution of the ALI's venue proposal is that it
discards at long last the troublesome and pointless special venue provisions for patent and copyright cases. 424 Unfortunately the commen419

If all defendants reside in this country, however, I would allow suit where any

one of them resides if the facts are foreign; the federal interest in seeing to it that
policies embodied in federal law are not defeated argues that reliance on foreign law
should be considered in making the choice of law, see People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria,
48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957), rather than made a barrier to jurisdiction, and it
will seldom be persuasive when all parties reside in the United States to argue that
overall litigation convenience would be served by requiring a trial abroad.
420 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. II, 1967) (corporations); Denver & R.G.W. Ry. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 562 (1967) (unions). It is not clear whether
§ 1391(c) applies to corporate plaintiffs as well as to defendants. Compare Southern
Paperboard Corp. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 649, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (yes), with
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 94 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (no).
421 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 12-13, § 1314(b).
422 Id. at 131.
423 See text at notes 167-73 supra.
424

28 U.S.C. §§ 1400(a), (b) (1964). See the interpretive difficulties raised in Stonite

Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957); and the discussion in TE.NT. DRAFT No. 6, at 128-30.
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tary is silent as to the equally troublesome special venue sections of
the Jones Act and of the FELA; the Jones Act, which allows suit
where the employer "resides" or has his "principal office," 425 has been
held to incorporate the present general definition of corporate residence in section 1391, so that the employer may be sued wherever it
does business. 426 Presumably the ALI's proposed repeal of this general
definition of corporate citizenship will modify the venue in Jones Act
cases, but if the plaintiff is not to retain the advantage of choosing
among nearly limitless forums I see no reason to preserve the special
venue section at all. Indeed the propensity of accident plaintiffs to
choose inappropriate forums has already received the disapprobation of
Congress, for a distaste for such shenanigans was partly behind the
enactment of the transfer-of-venue provision in 1948.427 I would subject all federal-question cases to the ALI's general statute.
The federal-question draft makes one venue proposal that I find
wholly unacceptable. That is the codification of the existing rule that
suits in admiralty may be brought wherever any defendant, or any property subject to a maritime lien, may be found. 428 The Reporters make
no effort to show why the substantial policies of litigation convenience
that limit their proposal for venue in federal-question cases evaporate
at the water's edge; it seems likely that they have simply been bamboozled by the antiquarian crustaceans of the admiralty bar, who maintain a monopoly of aqueous litigation by promulgating the myth that
their subject is arcane. I should have thought that such nonsense had
been laid to rest by the long-delayed merger of the civil and the admiralty rules. It is time the lawmakers recognized that the presence of
the defendant or of his property in the forum district no more makes
that place a convenient or fair one for trial of an unrelated action
when the suit is labeled "admiralty" than when it is labeled "law."
to the
When the plaintiff invokes diversity, his maritime case is subject
429
ordinary venue provisions; suits "in admiralty" should be too.
It is noteworthy that the ALI has made its single test of the place
of trial in federal-question cases one of venue rather than of personal
jurisdiction. The difference lies in the judicially developed rule that
425 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). Cf. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1964) (FELA) ("doing business').

Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 207 (1966).
See Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964).
See 7A J. Moo.E, FEDERAL PRAcIcE 449 (2d ed. 1968); TNT. DRAFT No. 6, at 20-21,
§ 1318(a)(2).
429 The ALI points to one important qualification, namely the accepted practice of
allowing process to extend throughout a harbor area regardless of state lines. TENT.
DRAFT No. 6, at 158-60. If in rem process is to continue permitting suit in inappropriate
forums this qualification is a good one.
426

427
428
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a defendant may challenge a default judginent for lack of personal
jurisdiction but not for improper venue; 430 the Institute apparently
takes the p0 ition that the advantages of putting a case to final rest
as early as possible outweigh the inconvenience of requiring the defendant to appear in an inappropiate forum in order to establish his right
not to be sued there. I disagree, becaiuse of the possibility of harassment
opened up to plaintiffs with small and disputed claims, especially since
the plaintiff will frequently have to sue on his defatult judgni-ent in
another state in order to enforce it.
For diversity caes the Institute ptoposes to retain the double test
of venue and peisongl jurisdiction, defining venue much as in federalquestion cases except that when the facts are foreign, venue is laid
where a defendant resides, not where he may be found .431 This last is
an improvement. Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is left to
Civil Rule 4; which in turn leaves the matter largely to state law. The
Reporters believe the issue is "one appropriately to be left to the rulemakifig ;iuthority." 4312 They do not say why, and I do not see why. In
part, personal jurisdiction reflects the convenient place of trial, as does
venue; the Reporters grant that venue is an appropriate subject for
legislation. Moreover, variations in state choice-of-law principles 433 are
such that the choice of forum in a diversity case may very strongly
affect the ultimate decision; this consequence of the place of trial suggests that the stbject is hot mbst appropriately dealt with by a body
43 4
forbidden to meddle iith "any substantive iight."
Whether there ought to be a uniform federal 8tandard to determine
the place of tril in diversity cases is a more difficult question. The
lower courts have consistehtly held that diversity jurisdiction may not
be exercised, absent a federal statute or Civil Rule, unless personal
jurisdiction is conferred by state law.4 36 If the principle of the Erie
430 See, e.g., Conn. v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959) (jurisdiction).
The venue question seems to have escaped litigation; my conclusion stems in part from
the comiuin statement that lack of "jurisdiction" is virtually the sole groulhd for collateral attack, e.g., Willians v. North Carolind, 325 U.S. 226, 228, 229 (1945), And from
the Court's sharp insistence, in waiver cases, that venue is not a,matter of "jurisdiction."
E.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-8 (1939); THE REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTs, § 7, comment b (1942), makes the statement as baldly as I do, and also
without citation, that a federal judgment "is not void merely because the action was
brought in the wrong federal district."
431 OrFIcIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 13-14, § 1803.

433 Made applicable in diversity cases by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941).
43i 28 U.S.X. 6 272 (1964). Contrast the authorization of Congresi in Article IV 6f
the' Cd6xiUtutini to preitilbe the affect to be given 'conflicting state laws.
435 E.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 820 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
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case is simply that the diversity court should reach the same result as
would a court of the forum state, 436 or that forum-shopping should be
avoided, 43 7 deference to state law is clearly correct. But I agree with
Mr. Justice Harlan that Erie's aim is not uniformity for its own sake,
but respect for state policies in the absence of countervailing federal
concern. 438 As Judge Clark has pointed out, limitations on state service
of process are in all probability prompted more by constitutional doubts
-or, I should add, by inertia-than by any conscious policy of solicitousness toward nonresidents who enter the state. 439 I therefore think
it quite unlikely that a federal long-arm statute for diversity cases would
infringe the policy of the state where the federal court sits.
More serious, perhaps, is the risk of conflict with policy of a state
other than that of the forum. Insofar, however, as such policy relates
to the legitimate litigation convenience of the defendant, it should be
protected adequately by a federal standard based on the long-arm principle. So long as Klaxon remains the law care must be taken, as it ha
been in transfer cases, 440 not to allow a federal long arm to affect the
choice of law; overruling Klaxon obviously would help to assure that
a federal law of personal jurisdiction would not frustrate state interests.
Arguably, even if state policy would not be offended by a federal
standard, the federal forum should be available only if the local state
court is open, for only then is there a danger of prejudice. But if the
local plaintiff traveled to the defendant's home to sue, the case could
be brought in federal court; I think, as illustrated by the transfer
provision of section 1404(a), that since the case could properly be made
federal there is a federal interest in determining which district is the
most appropriate place of trial. In order to promote this federal interest and to do away with the unfortunate double standard of venue
and service of process, and in recognition of the fact that state interests
would not be significantly offended by enlarging personal jurisdiction
in diversity cases, Congress ought to abolish venue limitations and to
adopt a federal long-arm statute to govern diversity as well as federalquestion and admiralty cases. So far as I can see the terms of the statute
441
should be the same regardless of the basis for jurisdiction.
436 See

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).

See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-8 (1965), also referring to the problem of
"equal protection" for citizens of the forum state.
438 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-5 (1965) (concurring opinion). See also Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Friendly, In Praise of Erie--And oJ
the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 394-5 (1964).
439 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissent).
440 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
441 Similarly, there is no need for the Reporters to avoid overruling decisions requiring
dismissal in accord with state laws limiting "local" actions respecting land to the state
437
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Multi-party litigation, the Institute recognizes, presents special problems of venue and personal jurisdiction, regardless of the basis of federal jurisdiction. In interpleader cases the ALI means to retain the
present statute allowing venue "in the judicial district in which one
or more of the claimants reside" and to expand the present provision
for nationwide process to anywhere outside the country "that process
of the United States may reach. '442 These provisions, like the relaxation
of the Strawbridgerequirement, are necessary if the interpleader statute
is to accomplish its goal, and the policy of avoiding risks of multiple
liability is strong enough to justify subjecting some claimants to an
otherwise inappropriate forum. The same policy supports the similar
provision in dispersed-party cases for extended process and for venue
where a "substantial part" of events or property occurred or is located,
and where any party resides if the facts are all foreign. 443 The Reporters

avoid extending to interpleader the dispersed-party venue section, which
is more in line both with the ALI's general venue proposals and with
the long-arm principle than is the current statute, lest the reference to
"property" be held to allow suit where the stakeholder resides. 444
"Property" should be dropped from the formulation and the long-arm
principle of suit where the events occurred should be employed in
interpleader cases.
The problem of venue and process respecting additional parties impleaded under Rule 14 or brought in to answer a counterclaim under
Rule 13 is somewhat different, and the ALI does not consider it. Under present law, it has been said, the "majority" of courts dispense with
venue limitations in impleader, but Rule 14's direction to "serve a
summons and complaint" upon the third party requires respect for
Rule 4's limits on personal jurisdiction.445 The argument for relaxing
the protection against suit in an inappropriate forum is not as compelling in impleader as in interpleader, for there is no chance of multiple liability. Yet, in addition to the desirability of avoiding two trials
where the land is located. E.g., Still v. Rossville Crushed Stone Co., 370 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1966). See OFFICIAL DRArT, pt. I, at 81. According to 1 J.Moom, FEDmRAL PRACtiCE 1454-5
(2d ed. 1964), the present venue provision in § 1391 applies only to transitory actions; cf.
Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66 (1880) (national-bank venue statute). To the extent that the
situs of the land is an appropriate place of trial a federal long-arm statute would permit
suit there, but there is no excuse for adopting either federal or state rules prohibiting
suit in other convenient or interested states.
442 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1397, 2361 (1964); OFFICiAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 45, 161-2, § 2361 (italics
omitted).
443 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 34, 39, §§ 2342, 2344(a).
444 Id. at 161-2.
445 See Note, Ancillary Process and Venue in the Federal Courts, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1164,
1167 (1960).
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respecting a single transaction, it is relevant that inconsistent decisions
might leave a single wrongdoer bearing alone a burden that others
should share. The ALI's refusal to allow suit against two defendants
in the district where either resides 446 suggests the Reporters would
agree with me that this risk does not justify overriding the interest
of the absent third party. The ALI's general provision for venue where
the transaction occurred will minimize this problem, for in many cases
the third-party claim will be sufficiently connected to the forum district that an original suit against the third party could be brought
there. But the situation should be clarified by statute, since the Institute leaves process in diversity cases to state law and permits suit where
all defendants reside.
In short, the ALI's treatment of place of trial in federal-question
cases is an original and brilliant advance; in diversity and admiralty,
it is plodding and myopic.
CHANGE OF VENUE

The theory is good, but it is practically unworkable. It would be
mellow to try every action in the most convenient forum. But deciding where that forum is costs altogether too much time and money.
Professor Kitch has effectively penetrated the complacency surrounding section 1404(a) and has exposed its complexity. 447 Ignoring his advice, the ALI proposes to retain the transfer provision, to permit still
more transfers, and to enact four separate sections to govern transfer.
Transfer at present is hampered, if one thinks transfer a good thing,
by the statutory requirement that the receiving district be one in which
the action "might have been brought." The Supreme Court has made
clear that such limitations on the availability of a forum as state rules
against suits by foreign personal representatives are not to interfere
with the policy of finding the convenient federal forum, 448 but it has
held that federal venue statutes limit transfer: A defendant may not
obtain transfer to a district in which the plaintiff could not have sued
him, even though he is willing to waive the venue objection. 449 Since
the transfer statute requires that the receiving district be a convenient
one, this additional requirement seems unnecessary even if one views
venue statutes as affording protection to the plaintiff.
The ALI would remove this undesirable limitation in some but not
446 See text at notes 415-6 supra.
447 See Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND. L.J. 99 (1965).
448 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
449 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
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in all cases. Both drafts distinguish between transfer from proper and
from improper forums: If prignal yenue is laid in the ?wrong district,"
transfer still can be made only to a district in which the action "might
have been brought."4 50 I see no reason for this distinction; an ad hoc
determination of the best place of trial seems no less appropriate when
the initial forum is improper than when it is proper. The authors of
the diversity draft, apparently in fear lest plaintiffs use transfer to
secure trial in an otherwise inaccessible district, makes a further distinction among cases brought in a proper forum: When the defendant
seeks transfer, the case may be moved to "any district"; when the
plaintiff seeks transfer, the case may be transferred only to a'district
in which venue and process could be had.45 1 As usual the federal-question draft is better, relying on the requirement of convenience and
the interest of justice to avoid the risk of imposition in all transfers
from a proper forum. 452 The Institute also ought to make clear, as
several lower courts have held, that transfer is permissible when original
venue is proper but personal jurisdiction lacking; 453 the inability of
the courts to agree whether such cases fall within section 1404 or section 1406 acquires significance in light of the ALI's different definitions of the transferee forum in the two types of cases.
The divrsity draft unwisely introduces a new limitation: No transfer is to be permitted to a district in which "both one or more plaintiffs and all moving defendants would be barred" from invoking diversity jurisdiction because of citizenship or established business in
that state. 454 Here quite viidly the ALI's policy of confining diversity
to cases in which there is reason to fear bias conflicts with its policy of
trial in the most convenient forum; the effort to conserve federal resources will often result in trial in a federal court inconvenient for all
concerned.4 55 Finally, nothing but complication is gained by splitting
the present general transfer provisions into separate sections for diversity, federal-question, and federal-government cases.455 Simplifica450 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 14, § 1315(b); OFFIcIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 20, § 1306(b) (district
where venue and service proper).
451 OrriciAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 17, 19-20, §§ 1305(a), 1306(a).
452 TIr_.
DRAFT No. 6, at 14, § 1315(a). The federal-question transfer provisions apply
to maritime cases, see id. at 21, § 1318(c).
453 See United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964) (§ 1404); Dubin
v. United Statei, 380 F.2d 813, 815-6 (5th Cir. 1967) (§ 1406).
454 O icAuL D.Arr, pt. I, at 17-18, § 1305(b).
455 An escape hatch adds further to the burden of determining where a case will be
tried: If the only appropriate federal court is closed, the action may be stayed on condition of a waiver of objections to suit in an appropriate state court. Id.
456 Trr. DRAFT No. 6, at 32, § 1327, repeating almost verbatim the federal-question
proposal, this time for government litigation. § 1327(c) preserves and enlarges the pro-
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don counsels a single unified provision, especially since there are no
significant policies justifying differences based upon the ground of
jurisdiction.
Best of all, however, the transfer prbvisiong should be eliminated.
The only excuse for transfer or for its harsh predecessor, forum non
conveniens, 457 was the inexcusable overbreadth of the venue and personal-jurisdiction laws, which permitted suit against a corporation in
virtually any inconvenient district in which it did business. With the
Institute's laudable proposal to limit venue in order to assure that suit
is commenced in an appropriate forum, this excuse disappears. The
added convenience of assuring that trial is held at the more convenient
of two perfectly acceptable places-the defendant's home or the place
of the events-cannot be worth the extensive proof required to make
the determination. The present section 1406(a), which provides for
transfer as an alternative to dismissal when the suit is brought in an
improper forum, should be replaced by a provision suspending the
statute of limitations pending filing in an appropriate district within a
reasonable period such as thirty days, in order to spare the courts the
burden of passing upon which is the best place to have the trial.
One of the big factors causing delay in the determination of transfer
motions has been the uncertainty surrounding reviewability of decisions to transfer or not to transfer. The ALI deals inadequately with
this problem, forbidding all appellate review of the "exercise of discretion" on such a motion in some federal-question cases458 but making no mention of review in diversity cases. The federal-question review provision is right and should be extended across the board; there
is a need for uniformity in determining the meaning of the transfer
provision, but appellate courts should not be burdened, nor cases
delayed, by additional inquiry into the relative convenience of two or
more forums. 459 Yet even the federal-question provision fails to make
clear whether decisions respecting the interpretation of the transfer
section are immediately reviewable-as they must be if an entire trial
is not to be wasted-and, if so, whether in the transferor or in the transferee court. By no means should the situation in Hoffman v. Blacki be
permitted to recur: There a transfer, upheld by the transferor court
visions now in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(c), 1506 (1964) for transfer when a suit within the
exclusive jurisdiction of one federal court is filed in another. These provisions avoid
unnecessary hardship, but suspending the statute of limitations might reach the same
result with less judicial effort. Cf. text at notes 457-8 infra.
457 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
458 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 14, § 1315(a). This provision applies only when the original
forum is proper.
459 See Kitch, supra note 447, 40 IND. L.J. at 117-26.
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of appeals, was struck down by the transferee court of appeals, the Supreme Court unbelievably holding that the former decision was not
binding on the transferee courts. 460 Interlocutory appeal adds greatly
to the time and expense of litigation; even the ideal review section,
limiting review to questions of law in the transferor court of appeals,
would be an additional argument for abolishing the entire transfer
statute.
The diversity draft proposes to codify the decision in Van Dusen v.
Barrack, that a defendant does not get a change of law by moving for
transfer from a proper forum: The transferee court is to decide the
case as if it had remained where originally filed. 46' This is calcification
as well as codification, for the decision left open the question of choice
of law in cases in which the transferor state would have dismissed on
grounds of forum non conveniens. 4612 The philosophy of Barrack was

to assure that the accident of diversity did not affect the outcome; if
the transferor state would not have heard the case, to apply its choiceof-law rules departs from this goal. The difficulty of investigating the
law and practice respecting forum non conveniens in the transferor
state4 63 is a strong point in favor of the ALI's simplified version.
However, in the other two cases distinguished and reserved in
Barrack, those of transfer from an improper forum or on the plaintiff's
motion,464 the Institute is able to refine the relevant policy without re-'
quiring a burdensome investigation: In both these cases the transferee court is to apply "the same law which it would have applied
had the action been commenced in that court.

'465

This is sound, for

it keeps the transfer section from giving the plaintiff, who can shop
interstate for the favorable law, the added and peculiarly federal advantage of doing so without sacrificing a convenient forum. Tying the
choice of law to the federal venue statute, however, does not seem quite
appropriate; Klaxon policy4 66 tells us that the critical question should
be whether the case could have been brought in the courts of the
transferor state.
Once again the awkwardness of attempting to reconcile deference to
state choice-of-law doctrines with federal policies respecting the appropriate place of trial argues for the overruling of Klaxon; my only
460
461
462
463

447-9
464
465
466

363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960).
376 U.S. 612 (1964); OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 18, § 1305(c).
376 U.S. at 640.
See B. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405,
(1955).
376 U.S. 634, 640 n.29.
OFFIciAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 20, § 1806(c).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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reservation is the uncertainty that a satisfactory federal body of doctrine
could be created to resolve cases of true conflict. And until Klaxon is
overruled this awkwardness is an additional argument against transfer.
ABSTENTION AND RELATED DOCTRINES

From time to time, in deference to state interests, Congress has
created exceptions to the general grants of diversity and federal-question jurisdiction. Thus federal courts are forbidden to enjoin the enforcement of state or local taxes or utility-rate orders if there is an
effective state-law remedy; 467 federal actions to enjoin enforcement of
state statutes or orders are to be stayed if a state court has suspended
enforcement pending an enforcement action; 468 federal injunctions
against pending state-court proceedings are limited by statute; 469 federal
habeas corpus for state convicts is available only after exhaustion of
state-court remedies. 470 The Supreme Court, however, in the face of
statutory commands that jurisdiction extend to "all" federal-question
and diversity cases as defined, 471 has created several additional exceptions.
First of all, as the result of an ancient dictum 472 only recently challenged by a district court, 473 the federal courts have refused jurisdiction
to grant a divorce or to award alimony. The Supreme Court has said
there is no federal jurisdiction to administer an estate or to probate a
will.4 7 4 Proceedings such as workmen's compensation that state law
has committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative agency
will not be entertained by federal courts.4 75 Moreover, the Supreme
Court in the Burford and Alabama cases refused to interfere, despite
the presence of diversity or a federal question, with the enforcement of
state administrative orders regarding permission to drill for oil or to
467 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1964). The rate provision, § 1342, is somewhat more qualified.
468 28 U.S.C. § 2284(5) (1964).
469 28 US.C. § 2283 (1964).
470 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (Supp. II, 1967).
471 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1964).
472 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859). Arguments for and against exclusive divorce jurisdiction are considered in D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict
of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 26, 49-53 (1966).
473 Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
474 Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (dictum).
475 Cf. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., "348 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1000 (1966), holding in deference to Alabama law that an Alabama court would not
entertain a claim for compensation under Georgia law that Georgia committed exclusively
to its own commission; Zeidner v. Wulforst, 197 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), respecting
a statute confining suits against a government agency to the New York Court of Claims.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:268$

discontinue a train: The oil case was touchy and complex and the
rail case "local," and in both, the states had provided an adeqtiate,
centralized avenue for review of administrative determinations. 47 6 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, paraphrasing Marshall's admonition that courts
have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdictiqn which is
is given, than to usurp that which is not given," 477 and stressing that it
was the very premise of federal jurisdiction that state-court remedies
were not adequate to protect federal interests, dissented in both cases.
Finally, relying in part on the traditional notion (not found in the
statu-te unless by use of tie word "may") that declaratory relief is "discretionary," the Supreme Court has held that federal courts should
not issue declaratory judgments as to state taxes;4 78 and it has invoked

the equitable reluctance-to enjoin criminal proceedings in order to
refuse interference, absent compelling circumstances, with threatened
479
state criminal prosecutions alleged to contravene federal law.
In addition to these court-made principles requiring dismissal of
cases not explicitly excepted by Congress from the general jurisdiction
grants are the Supreme Court's familiar doctrines of abstention and
certification, both championed, inconsistently enough, by Mr. justice
Frankfurter, 480 and both resulting, in theory, in referring not the
48 1
entire case but particular state-law issues to state courts for decision.
Apparently Mr. Justice Frankfurter's sense of duty was satisfied so
long as th6 federal court decided part of the case: "Abstention," as the
Court several times said meaninglessly, involves not "the abdication of
'482
jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise.
As originally conceived in the Pullman case, abstention meant sending the parties to a state court for an interpretation of unclear state
law in suits to enjoin the enforcement of state law on constitutional
grounds. In this type of case abstention served to avoid three misfortunes: premature decision of constitutional questions, the misinter476 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (oil); Alabama Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951) (railroad).
477 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
478 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 29 (1948).
479 See text at notes 549-59 infra. See also Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., gl U.S.
.1o, 228 (19bs), refifig to-entertain a challenge to state rail rates beause the "1egislative"
process of 'rate-making included a review in the ^state's highes t court that had not been
utilized: "Litigation cannot arise until the moment of legislation is past." Cf. also the
decisions, infra text at notes 574-5, staying federal actions pending the outcome of related
state proceedings to avoid multiple litigation.
480 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 US. 496 (1941) (abstention); Clay v. Sun

In. Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (certification).
481 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 875 U.S. 411 (1964).
482

E.g., id. a; 416.
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pretation of state law, and friction between the federal courts and the
states. Consequently, abstention was not proper if the constitutional
question was insubstantial or the state law clear. Mr. Justice Brennan's
separate opinions, though he was not an especial champion of the
doctrine, recognized a second category of cases in which abstention was
proper: Those in which state law was unclear and a federal decision
might seriously disrupt state activities or unsettle a "delicate balance in
4' 8 3
the area of federal-state relationships.

Two additional Frankfurter opinions, however, carried abstention
to perhaps greater lengths. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodau, 4 4 over three dissents, the Court upheld abstention in an
expropriation case based on diversity, because state law was unclear and
eminent domain was of special concern to the state. There was no substantial constitutional question to avoid, and the Suit was not of a type
formerly equitable. In the light of a decision rendered the same
day refusing to recognize eminent domain as a subject excluded from
the diversity jurisdiction,4 85 Mr. Justice Brennan objected in dissent
that abstention in Thibodaux could be based only on a distaste for
the diversity jurisdiction or on the ambiguity of the state law; neither
of these, he thought, should suffice. In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office,
again over dissents, the Court ordered a lower court to take advantage
of a Florida statute authorizing replies by the state supreme court to
486
questions of Florida law certified to them by other appellate courts.

There was a substantial constitutional issue in Clay, and the state law
was unclear; but the danger of friction was reduced because the action
was for damages and between private parties, involving neither the interdictory effect of an injunction nor the abrasive of a decision against
a state official.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals took advantage of the Thibodaux
and Clay decisions to invoke both abstention and certification in run-ofthe-mill diversity cases on the single ground that state law was unclear. 487 As David Liebenthal has observed, 488 this procedure was a

natural outgrowth of the necessity to follow state decisional law after
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins; but it was very much a negation of the poli483 See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 32 (1959)
(dissent); Martin v. Creasy, Bo0 U.S. 219, 225, 226 (1959) (concurrence).
484 80 U.S. 25 (1959).
485 County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
486 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
487 United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (1964) (abstention); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (1963) (certification).
488 Liebenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England Case, Its Effect on the Abstention
Doctrine, and Some Suggested Solutions, 18 W. Ras. L. RFY. 157, 158 n.2 (1966).
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cies behind the diversity jurisdiction, for the obscurity of state law
furnishes a unique opportunity for undetectable implementation of
bias. Moreover, there is often very little left for the federal court to
decide after the state courts have settled the only disputed legal issue
4 s9
in the case.

Even the Fifth Circuit has now receded from its extreme position, 490
and the Supreme Court's decisions by no means justify abstention on
the basis of unclear state law alone. Not only did Thibodaux attempt,
if weakly, to distinguish the earlier Meredith decision holding unclear
state law insufficient ground for abstention, 491 but the opinion is
based in large part upon the allegedly special nature of eminent domain. Moreover, the case can be easily fitted into Mr. Justice Brennan's second category of permissible abstention cases, for an adverse
federal decision based upon an error of state law would have prevented
the local government from carrying out its large-scale plan to provide
utility service to its constituents. 492 Clay, which involved the less drastic
device of certification, was after all a case containing a substantial constitutional question to be avoided.
In the past few years the Supreme Court has shown an increasing
reluctance to invoke the doctrine of abstention in the traditional constitutional cases. The Court manages always to discover that there has
been too much delay already 493 or that because of the nature of the issue
(overbreadth or vagueness) state-court clarification would not obviate
the constitutional question. 494 In addition, in one recent case the Supreme Court added to the elapsed delay two new factors that could severely limit abstention: Neither party had requested abstention, and a
federal injunction would not impair "an entire legislative scheme of
regulation" because the statute was attacked only as applied to foreign
495
commerce.
489 In Thibodaux, however, the federal court ultimately settled the amount of com-

pensation after the state court established the right of expropriation. 373 F.2d 870 (5th
Cir. 1967).
490 See Howell v. Union Iroducing Co., 392 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1968).

491 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), discussed, 360 U.S. at 27 n.2.
492 See Record, at 5-6.
493 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 219 (1964); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
494 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 575-8 (1964); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
490-2 (1965), also noting that the good faith of the state officials was challenged; Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
495 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964). See also
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963), declaring it immaterial in an action to
correct school segregation that the conduct might violate state law; Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678, 690-1 (1964), stressing the absence of pending state proceedings; Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965), emphasizing the "fundamental" nature of the right to
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Despite the disfavor in which the present Supreme Court seems to
hold its own doctrine, the Institute proposes to give both abstention
and certification an honest statutory pedigree. 496 The proposed categories of abstention are the accepted ones laid out by Mr. Justice Brennan: There must in any case be an unresolved state-law issue, and in
addition either a substantial constitutional question to avoid, "serious
danger of embarrassing the effectuation of State policies" by an erroneous decision of state law, or "other circumstances of like character,"
whatever that means. Certification on the other hand, despite the Re49 is to be allowed whenever,
porters' initial inclination to disregard it,
absent "undue delay" or prejudice to the parties, a controlling statelaw question "cannot be satisfactorily determined in the light of the
State authorities. '" But abstention and certification are both to be barred in suits by the United States or its officers, and in suits to redress
the denial, on racial grounds, of the right to vote, or of equal protec498
tion.
It is a logical corollary of the policies behind abstention that after
decision of the disputed state-law issue the case can be brought back to
federal court for further disposition. In this way, the Court has said,
both state and federal courts do what is most within their competence:
Each decides issues of its own law. 499 But this procedure creates problems of its own. The Reporters' summary of the relevant considerations
is brilliant:
To litigate these cases entirely through the federal courts
strains state-federal relations, may require the premature decision of federal constitutional questions, and requires the
federal court to pass on questions of state law in circumstances
under which an erroneous decision may seriously interfere
with state substantive policies. To litigate such cases entirely
vote and the "immediacy" of the need for decision because an election was impending.
But cf. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965), surprisingly requiring a federal court to
stay implementation of a reapportionment order because the state supreme court, in an
action filed after the federal, had also held the old law invalid.
496 TNT. DRAr"No. 6, at 38-40, § 1371(c)-(g).
497 Id. at 214.
498 Present law allows abstention in federal-government cases. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 220, 228-30 (1957). But cf. Department of Employment v. United
States, 385 U.S. 355, 558 (1966), holding the stay provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964) inapplicable to suits by the United States; and the like decision respecting the limitation
on enjoining state-court actions (§ 2283) in Leiter itself, 352 U.S. at 224-6.
499 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-6 (1964).
Under England the litigant must walk a tight rope: He is required to make the state
court aware of his constitutional claim, so the state law can be construed to avoid it; but
if he argues his constitutional claim to the state court he loses his right to return to the
federal. 375 U.S. at 419-20.
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through the state fourt9, with reVieiw in the United States Supreme Court; deprives plaintiff of federal fact-findii-g, and
of fedekal protection during the pendency of the state action.
To shuttle the cases back and forth from state to federal court,
as preseht doctrines permit, "operates to require piecemeal
adjudication in many courts . . . theieby delaying ultimate
adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time." 50 0
The A.I's so1ution, coricededly not a perfect 0ne, is to forbid abstention altogether uhiless the fedral clai,
"including any issues of fact
material thereto," can be adequately prtected by Supreme Court review of the gtate -curt decision; if the federal couri does abstain, the
entire case is to be tried in state court, with f~deral jurisdiction retained
only to asiurie interim p-r6t'ction and to aliow' recapture of the litigation in case the state proceeding proves ineffective to reach a prompt
final disposition.ir °
I disagree. If we must have abstention, I think we should preserve
the p6wek of the iederai coUrit to decide all issues except unclear matters of state laie, gince this arifigement sacrifices as little as possible of
the 'important policy of providing i federal f6rhm. The ALI's compromise unfortunately would require the federal court tio make still
another threshold investigation in order tb decide wtiether to decide
the case, and it may n6t always be easy to decide whether Supreme
Court review would be adequate protection. Surely the ALI does not
propose that the federal court try to assess the likelihood that a particular state Court would see'k to cheat the plaintiff out of his federal
right; 50 2 prestimably, the test would be the extent to which the federal
right depends iipoh the facts to be found and whether or not the
right would be defeated by an adverse rtiliiig on state law. I think
the test for abstenti6n, if we must have it at all, ought to be simpler
than this: Abstention on the disputed state question alone, whenever resolutibn of that question may avoid a serious issue of constitutional law. The ALI's s'oxia category of Tbstention cases is too vagae
to be easily administrable, and many cases involving the risk of "embarrassing the effectuation of State policies" will be encbmpassed in
the provision regarding cbnstitutional cases. If there musi be a second
category, it should be made more understandable and more concrete:
Cases in which a state official is sought to be enjoined from enforcing
unclear state law.
5bo TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 206.
ol id. it 38-39; §4 1371(c), (d).
502 Cf. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 827-8 (l966J.
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But I would dispense with abstention altogether. I do not share the
view that the federal courts, whose job is in significant part to enforce
the Constitution, ought to carry their understandable desire to postpone ultimate confrontations so far as to refuse to decide the case.
Finding narrow grounds of decision in order to avoid constitutional
questions is no disservice to the litigant; forcing him to split his lawsuit in two or denying him a federal forum is. In ordinary diversity
cases, moreover, abstention is likely to deprive the plaintiff of a federal
hearing as to the only question of importance; in constitutional cases,
even if the federal question and its attendant facts are to be decided
by the federal court and if a state-created right is not a requisite of the
federal, the delays and added cost of abstention, which have been chronicled in hideous detail50 3 give the practice a Bleak House aspect that
in my mind is too high a price to pay for the gains in avoiding error,
friction, and constitutional questions. Last of all, if the question were
a close one, I think the balance would be swung by the time saved if
federal courts did not have to go through the troubles of deciding
whether or not to abstain-an issue whose difficulty is attested to by the
substantial number of Supreme Court decisions attempting with only
limited success to define the limits of the doctrine.
Certification the Institute would authorize in order to clarify any
foggy state-law issue.50 4 Certification has the decided advantages of

allowing somewhat greater protection of the rights of litigants by having
the facts stipulated or stated by the federal court and by assuring federal
disposition of all but the certified issues, and of mitigating cost and
delays by sending the disputed question directly to the state's highest
court, dispensing with the necessity for a state-court trial. Unfortunately it presents the questions to the state court in rather abstract
form, which may not be conducive to an accurate answer. Whether or
not the unavoidable costs and delays are merited by the avoidance of
error is arguable; at least the Institute's certification proposal is dear
and easy to administer, except for the requirement that certification not
cause undue delay or prejudice. I think I should prefer to let the federal
courts muddle through murky state law on their own, in the interest
of judicial economy, but I do not object strongly to the certification
proposal.
The Institute also intends to preserve the existing statutory limitations on federal jurisdiction to enjoin state taxes or rate orders, to extend the limitation to embrace declaratory judgments, and to include
503 See Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1358
(1960).
504 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 39, § 1371(e).
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in the limitation suits attacking state orders respecting the use or conservation of natural resources, 05 There are exceptions to the rate
limitation that the ALI means to restate and make applicable to resource cases: The order must have been made after reasonable notice
and hearing and, according to the new formulation, must not have
been "superseded by any Act of Congress or administrative regulation thereunder." The reason for these exceptions, presumably, is
the importance of assuring the supremacy of preemptive federal
laws toward which state courts may lack sympathy and of protecting
the due-process rights of litigants. Other claims of federal right, such
as the ho-hum assertion of confiscation, are less likely to require federal
protection; and the protection of out-of-state litigants in diversity
cases is to be sacrificed in order not to risk erroneous interference with
substantial state policies in matters likely to be scientifically or economically complicated and outside the normal purview of federal
judges. The balance struck by the ALI is a reasonable one, especially
if one does not take too seriously the dangers of bias that underlie
diversity jurisdiction. I have less sympathy for the long-standing limitation on enjoining state taxes; constitutional issues in such cases may
often be substantial and state law lacking in specialized complexity.
But I doubt that repeal could be pushed through Congress.
In 1958 Congress forbade removal of cases arising under state workmen's-compensation laws.5 0 6 The diversity draft proposes to exclude
these cases from the original jurisdiction as well.50 7 This move goes
beyond the principle of allowing the states to concentrate proceedings
before an expert tribunal, for it bars federal review of the initial
agency decision. It also goes behond the 1958 policy of protecting
the needy litigant's choice of a convenient state forum, as in FELA
and Jones Act cases,508 for the ALI would forbid the injured employee
to sue in a federal court. The rationale given is to relieve the federal
courts of a substantial burden of litigation and to prevent the race to
the courthouse door. Moreover, say the Reporters, these cases "are
more appropriate for state determination."5 09 That was not what Congress said in 1958, and it is not clear why compensation cases are any
less deserving than other accident litigation of a federal forum. Perhaps
the proposal is a first step toward Dean Meador's goal of excluding
all accident cases because of their large litigation cost and their re505 Id. at 38, §§ 1371(a), (b).
506 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1964).
507 OFFIcuL DRAFT, pt. I, at 10, § 1301().
508 See text at notes 269-70 supra; S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
509 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 66-67.
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moteness from the commercial context that arguably presents the
greatest threat of prejudice.5 10
The Sixth Tentative Draft contained a proposed section intended to
codify the existing judicial exclusion of domestic-relations and estateadministration cases from federal jurisdiction. 511 The idea of codification was a good one, but the Institute's members were unable to agree
on the definition of the excluded subjects-not surprisingly, in view
of the amorphous state of the law-and the section was removed from
the draft by a unanimous vote. 512 If these exclusions are justified, it is

because of the danger of error in administering laws that depend more
upon the judge's sensitive discretion than upon what can be found in
the books.513 The question should be further studied.
THREE-JUDGE DisTuc-r COURTS
It is not surprising that I am enthusiastic over the ALI's proposals
respecting three-judge district courts in constitutional cases, since they
are largely derived from my own. 514 I shall not repeat here what I
have spelled out in detail elsewhere, except to note that the ALI draft
would eliminate the difficulty posed by the Phillips and Bransford
cases 515 of determining whether the complaint really attacks the validity of a statute or of an executive or administrative decision; would
extend the requirement to the declaratory-judgment case, which is
indistinguishable in principle from the suit for injunction; 51 would
tailor the cure to the disease by dispensing with the three-judge court
unless the state requests it; and would make clear that the courts of
appeals may review the refusal of the trial judge to call for a three-judge
court.51 7 The change regarding declaratory judgments rationalizes the

law without adding complexity; the other changes will substantially
510 See Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46

A.B.A.J. 383,

384 (1960).
511 TNT. DRAFT No. 6, at 36, § 1330.
512 See 36 U.S.L.W. 2740-1 (1968).
513 See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and

Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 26, 49-53 (1966). The existing limits are discussed in Vestal
& Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN.

L. RFv. 1 (1956).
514 D. Currie, The Three-judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Cmi.
L. REv. 1 (1964); TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 240-1.

515 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941); Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354,
360-1 (1940).
516 Three judges were held not required in declaratory-judgment actions in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-5 (1963).
517 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 43-46, §§ 1374-6. For confusion regarding appeals, see
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 870 U.S. 713 (1962), and later cases noted
in D. CuRam, FEDmmL CouRTs 553-4 (1968).
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reduce the burden of administering the three-judge provisions, which
has been considerable. The Institute also feels on sufficiently firm
ground to propose abolition of the three-judge requirement in actions
attacking federal as opposed to state statutes because of the absence
in such cases of an irritant to federal-state relations and because federal
trial judges today are not engaged in any substantial degree in the
518
practice of sabotaging federal statutes.
I hope the Congress will buy these amendments, and I should be
happier still if the three-judge requirement could be abolished across
the board; the special court when required decreases the efficiency
of federal judges by a factor of three, and the Supreme Court is burdened with the sole responsibility of reviewing three-judge cases regardless of their importance. 519 I have said elsewhere that I can understand the desire for the safeguard of numbers against error or prejudice
when important state programs are at stake and the value of the extra
prestige of three judges in cushioning the friction of striking down
state laws, and I recognize that the number of three-judge cases has not
been intolerable. 520 The special court, in short, is a means of making
the necessary medicine of federal review of state laws less irritating and
less subject to abuse than it might otherwise be. Nevertheless, if I had
my druthers I would eliminate the three-judge court altogether and
spare the federal courts not only the inefficiences of its actual operation
but also the considerable burden, only partly relieved by the proposed
amendments, of deciding when three judges are required and what
can be done by the single judge.
INJUNCIONs

AGAINST SUIT

"The use of injunctions to stay actions at law," says Pomeroy, "was
521
almost coeval with the establishment of the chancery jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court has held it proper for one federal court to restrain
a litigant from proceeding in another federal court, 522 and for a court

of one state to enjoin a litigant from suing in another state. 52 3 But in
most cases judicial economy would be better served by defending an
existing action than by bringing a second action to enjoin the first;
and, especially when the two courts are of different sovereignties, an
injunction forbidding suit can be a ready cause of irritation. In ex518 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 248-9.
519 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
520 D. Currie, supra note 514, 82 U. Cm. L. REV. at 3-12.
521 5 J. PomERoy, EQUITy JURISVRUDENCE § 2058 (4th ed. 1919).
522 Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 801 U.S. 278 (1937).
523 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 121 (1890).
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treme cases courts in which a litigant has been enjoined from proceeding have responded by enjoining enforcement of the injunction: "This
court need not, and will not, countenance having its right to try cases,
of which it has proper jurisdiction, determined by the courts of other
States, through their injunctive process." 524 "The place to stop this
unseemly kind of judicial disorder," wrote Illinois Justice Schaefer
5' 25
in protest against such a disposition, "is where it begins.
Congress in 1793 emphatically shared Mr. Justice Schaefer's opinion,
enacting an apparently absolute prohibition against federal courts' enjoining state-court proceedings. 526 Various possible justifications for this
ban were discussed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Court opinion in
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.: antifederal sentiments engendered by the assertion of jurisdiction over a state in Chisholm v. Georgia;5 2 7 the policy against splitting one litigation between two court systems; and the 1793 prejudice against equity jurisdiction. The opinion
concluded that Congress desired to "avoid friction between the federal
government and the states resulting from the intrusion of federal
52 8
authority into the orderly functioning of a state's judicial process.
Unfortunately the prohibition did not long remain absolute. Congress modified the anti-injunction statute itself in 1872 to allow injunctions against state suits when authorized by the bankruptcy laws; 529
other statutes expressly or impliedly authorizing anti-suit injunctions
were held to qualify the earlier prohibition;53 0 and frequent dicta
established, in the teeth of the statute, that an injunction was permissible against state proceedings "seeking to interfere with property in the
custody of the [federal] court"53' because, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said, "contest between the representatives of two distinct judicial systems over the same physical property would give rise to actual physical
friction," an extreme example of the very kind of mischief the statute
was designed to prevent.53 2 Finally, when the Supreme Court in Toucey
itself repudiated earlier decisions thought to establish an additional exE.g., James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 Il1. 2d 356, 372, 152 N.E2d 858, 867 (1958).
Id., 14 IMI.2d at 375, 152 N.E.2d at 868.
526 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
527 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
528 314 U.S. 118, 130-1, 135 (1941).
524
525

529 Rev. Stat. § 720.
530 The Interpleader Act, ch. 273, § 2, 44 Stat. 416 (1926), expressly allowed an injunc-

tion against "any suit or proceeding in any State court." See also Providence & N.Y.S.S.
Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 599-600 (1883) (Limitation of Liability Act); Dietzsch
v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494 (1881) (removal statutes, which dated from 1789 but had
been recodified).
531 See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922).
532 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 135 (1941).
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ception allowing an injunction against harassing relitigation of matters
concluded by a federal judgment, 53 3 Congress amended the statute
completely in 1948.
The result was the present section 2283, which allows a federal court
to enjoin state proceedings in three situations: "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments." The purpose of the revision,
according to the Reviser's Notes, was to "restore the basic law as
generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision."
The "expressly authorized" provision is a substitute for the earlier
bankruptcy exception, broadened "to cover all exceptions"; "in aid
of its jurisdiction" provides symmetry, for unexplained reasons, with
the All Writs section 34 and preserves the power to enjoin after removal
from state courts; "to protect or effectuate its judgments" overrules
Toucey.

This detailed commentary is not sufficient to dispel the dense clouds
of ambiguity enveloping this most obscure of all jurisdictional statutes.
Since the Reviser meant to preserve existing statutory exceptions to
the injunctions ban, the term "expressly authorized" is poorly chosen:
Several statutes held to have qualified the original prohibition were
anything but express. 535 Consequently "expressly" has consistently been
read to mean "impliedly"; the latest craze is to hold "express" the
authorization of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1,5 6 which says nothing
about proceedings in other courts or injunctions against them: Every
person who under color of state law deprives another of constitutional
rights "shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." It is still unclear
whether a statute giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction is
sufficiently "express." Apparently the Reviser hoped to emphasize
533 E.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). See also Simon
v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915), allowing an injunction against the dnforcement of
judgments obtained from state courts by fraud. This exception too was disapproved in
Toucey, 314 U.S. at 136.
534 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
535 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1964) (Bankruptcy Act: A "suit" against the bankrupt "shall
be stayed'); 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) (Limitation Act: All proceedings "shall cease").
536 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The power to enjoin was upheld in Cooper v. Hutchinson,
184 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1950), and asserted in dissent in Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F.
Supp. 873, 885 (S.D. Miss. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). Contra, in
addition to Cameron, is Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964). See also
Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 230-2 (5th Cir. 1965), distinguishing Baines in order
to hold an injunction against state proceedings "expressly authorized" by the publicaccommodations sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: "no person shall . . . attempt
to punish" for exercising -protected rights,
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that authorization for an injunction against suit was not to be lightly
inferred, but the result has been nothing but confusion.
Injunctions "necessary in aid of" federal jurisdiction, the Reviser
said, were meant to include those in removed cases. This statement
creates still further doubt as to the meaning of the "expressly authorized" clause, since the removal statute's direction that "the State court
shall proceed no further"5 37 is no less "express" than others that apparently come within the first exception. Lower courts have held, in
addition, that "in aid of ...jurisdiction" includes the old in rem exception,5 38 probably because there is no other likely place to insert it
and because the Revisers meant to leave the law unchanged except for
Toucey. The Supreme Court too has found additional meaning in
"aid of . . . jurisdiction," allowing the National Labor Relations
Board to obtain an injunction against a state-court suit to restrain a
secondary boycott within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board: "If
the state court decree were to stand, the Federal District Court would
be limited in the action it might take .... To exercise its jurisdiction
' 9
freely and fully it must first remove the state decree." i5
In a very similar case, however, the Court held no injunction could
issue when requested by the union: Only the Board was authorized by
statute to resort to the court's equity powers; the union's injunction
plea was not ancillary to any jurisdiction of the district court over the
underlying labor dispute, and "such non-existent jurisdiction therefore
cannot be aided. ' 540 This holding was entirely in accord with the statutory language, but the argument for an injunction was as compelling in
the one case as in the other. The requirement that the injunction be
ancillary to pre-existing federal jurisdiction is without basis, and it suggests the possibility that the prohibition can be avoided by simply
adding to the complaint a request for declaratory judgment, so long as
the amorphous requirement of "necessary" is met.5 4 '
Lower courts, relying on the Reviser's disclaimer of an intention to
alter the law apart from Toucey, have indicated that, in accord with
decisions under the earlier prohibition, the pendency of multiple in
personam actions respecting the same transaction is not a ground for
enjoining state proceedings. 42 Again the statutory language is mis537 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1964).

538 E.g., Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501, 508 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,

391 U.S. 905 (1968).
539 Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501, 505-6 (1954).
540 Amalgamated Clothing Wkrs. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 519 (1955).
541 But see Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 583, 587 (4th Cir. 1964), where
the court was unimpressed by the addition of a declaratory plea.
542 E.g., Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501, 508 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 905 (1968), cting Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922).
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leading, for the necessity of an injunction seems more pressing in such
a case than in most of those in which the writ is allowed. The defense
of res judicata, which the overruling of Toucey allows to be the subject of an injunction, can always be raised in the state court and reviewed by the highest federal court if necessary, and a state court that
proceeds despite removal can be reversed on appeal. But the state court
need not relinquish jurisdiction just because the same controversy is
pending in a federal court; an injunction is literally the only way to
prevent the federal court's jurisdiction from being effectively destroyed
by a prior state judgment. The difficulty with this argument is that
there has never been a federal right, except in cases of removal or exclusive jurisdiction, to be free from multiple actions arising from a
single transaction. The Reviser's Notes do not suggest an intention to
create one. Thus the second category of cases in which state suits may
be enjoined, like the first, is framed in language so vague as to defy
construction except by reference to the pre-existing law that it was intended to codify; and it conforms but poorly to the policies that ought
to determine the availability of such injunctions.
The exception permitting injunctions to "protect or effectuate"
federal judgments probably means only that the binding effect of a
federal judgment can be asserted by enjoining state proceedings on
the same cause of action. This is the purpose made explicit by the
Reviser. It seems unlikely that injunctions against concurrent state
actions, forbidden before the amendment and not referred to in the
commentary, were meant to be allowed in order to protect future
federal judgments; the judgments referred to, the Fourth Circuit has
properly held, are those already entered. 543 But a recent Supreme Court
decision suggests a way around the ban: Section 2283 forbids only injunctions, not declaratory judgments; 44 if the plaintiff obtains a declaration of his rights from a federal court, an injunction against further
state proceedings may be necessary to effectuate the declaratory judgment.
As if this were not enough, the Supreme Court, notwithstanding its
declaration that the prohibition is "qualified only by specifically defined exceptions" and "not to be whittled away by judicial improvisations," 545 has held the prohibition inapplicable to suits brought by the
United States, because statutes divesting pre-existing rights or privileges
"will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that
Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 587 (1964).
Cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) (nonstatutory policy against enjoining
state criminal proceedings).
545 Amalgamated Clothing Wkrs. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 514, 516 (1955).
543

544
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effect" and because denying an injunction would so frustrate "superior
federal interests... that we cannot reasonably impute such a purpose
to Congress from the general language of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 alone."' 48
What these interests were the Court did not say; Congress, I think,
had made it dear that it was willing to risk the occasional denial of
relief in a deserving case in order to make certain that injunctions
against state suits would not be granted on the basis of ordinary equitable considerations. But this questionable decision may well have influenced the Fourth Circuit in making the following statement, which
is the epitome of judicial nihilism: "The statute ... is inapplicable in
extraordinary cases in which an injunction against state court proceedings is the only means of avoiding grave and irreparable injury. In our
view, the congressional command ought to be ignored only in the face
of the most compelling reasons .... ,,547 Congress cannot be blamed
for this sort of thing; perhaps these opinions suggest it is futile for
Congress to try to define limits in this field, for the courts may not
heed them. One hopes we have not reached that point.
The present statute, like its predecessor, has been held not to forbid
injunctions against state-court proceedings that have not yet been instituted, 4 1 although no hint of this distinction has ever intruded into
the statutory language and although the degree of offense to the states
may not be very different in the two classes of cases. This ruling has
led the Court into some rather strained maneuvering of the determinative date,5 49 and it makes the result depend upon a race to the courthouse. Moreover, freedom from the strictures of section 2283 does not
assure the plaintiff's success, for the Supreme Court has embraced the
equitable reluctance to interfere with criminal proceedings as an additional means of avoiding unnecessary friction with the states even
when the prosecution has not been begun.
The exact contours of this second limitation on suit injunctions are
not much dearer than those of the statute itself. Douglas v. City of
Jeannette550 forbade enjoining prosecution under an ordinance held
unconstitutional on the same day; the want of equity was dear, since
there was no reason to think the state would continue prosecution
in the face of the invalidating decision. Stefanelli v. Minard carried the
principle further by refusing to enjoin state-court use of illegally seized
evidence even though at the time there was no Supreme Court review
546 Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 224, 226 (1957).
547 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593 (1964).
548 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
549 See id.

o50
319 US. 157 (1943).
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of fourth amendment claims. There was no threat of irreparable injury, the Court amazingly said; and piecemeal intervention to try collateral issues was worse than enjoining the whole trial because it would
"invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts" on the
myriad questions of procedural due process. 551 Later decisions respecting injunctions against the use of various kinds of illegal evidence have
left nothing but uncertainty;5 5 2 of particular interest is the statement
by three Justices favoring such injunctions that section 2283 was inapplicable even after the state prosecution had begun because "the thrust
of the relief is only to enjoin the use of wire-tap evidence, not to en553
join the action itself."
In the important case of Dombrowski v. Pfister 54 the Court found
circumstances justifying an injunction against a state prosecution held
not to have been pending at the decisive moment: an attack on overbreadth grounds upon a state law impinging upon freedom of expression. The "chilling effect" of such a law upon constitutional rights
would not, the Court said, be removed by a series of prosecutions.
Moreover, the Court added in refusing to sanction abstention, the
prosecution had been brought in bad faith for purposes of harassment.
Probably either bad faith or overbreadth affecting expression would
suffice after Dombrowski;555 but most recently, in Cameron v. Johnson, the Court over dissent found against rather convincing allegations
of bad faith, declared a Mississippi demonstration statute neither too
vague nor too broad, and held that allegations that the conduct in issue
was protected by the first amendment were insufficient to permit an
injunction, apparently even against merely threatened proceedings. 55 6
On the other hand, shortly before Cameron, the Court held in Zwickler
v. Koota that the limitations on injunctions against threatened state
prosecutions are inapplicable to suits for declaratory judgment: The
federal courts are the primary forums for vindicating federal rights,
and a suitor's choice of forum should be respected. 55 7
Where all this leaves us is far from plain. Douglas v. City of Jeannette
551 342 U.s. 117, 122-3 (1951).
552 Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961);
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
553 Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 406 (1963) (dissent); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S.
458, 462 (1961) (dissent).
554 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
555 See United Steelworkers v. Bagwell, 383 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1967), and Carmichael
v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967), both allowing injunctions without finding
harassment; Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), denying an injunction on the
ground that neither overbreadth nor bad faith was established.
556 390 U.S. 611 (1968). See also Zwickler v. Boll, 391 U.S. 353 (1968).
557 389 US. 241 (1967).
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had sensibly said that an injunction was proper "in those exceptional
cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent." 5 s Dombrowski and
Cameron seem to particularize this standard into categories with little
regard for the basic policy: Overbreadth and bad faith seem decisive,
and the likelihood of adequate state-court relief is ignored. Thus the
decisions leave something to be desired in terms both of policy and of
clarity, and the statute remains wholly silent on the subject.
The ALI proposes a thorough revision of section 2283.r- 9 Making
clear that the prohibition extends to injunctions against the enforcement of state-court judgments as well as against state-court proceedings,5 60 the proposal would rightly assure that injunctions within the
enumerated exceptions issue not automatically but only if "otherwise
warranted." The present three exceptions become seven. The vague exceptions for injunctions in aid of jurisdiction and to protect federal
judgments are narrowed and clarified: "to protect the jurisdiction of
the court over property in its custody or subject to its control," and
"to protect or effectuate an existing judgment of the court." Judicially
created exceptions allowing injunctions sought by the federal government, and temporary injunctions "pending determination of whether
this section permits grant of a permanent injunction," are codified.
The troublesome "expressly authorized" language is replaced: An injunction is proper if "an Act of Congress authorizes such relief or
provides that other proceedings shall cease." This exception is meant
to include bankruptcy, limitation, and removal cases as well as those
under more specific statutes; it would be enough if the statute said
that a federal court might "stay any proceeding" or that a state court
"shall proceed no further." 561 Although statutory interpleader would
be embraced within this exception, a separate provision is made for
injunction "in aid of a claim for interpleader" in order to take care
of "equitable interpleader" under Rule 22.562 The commentary expressly disapproves injunctions against the enforcement of state-court
judgments obtained by fraud, in order to prevent "fragmentation" of
the controversy, and because the state court is better able "to determine
what it has passed upon."5 63 No injunction is to be allowed merely
558 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).

559 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 41-42, § 1372.
560 Nothing, however, is said about enjoining the use of evidence in state courts,
though the problem has several times reached the Supreme Court. See text at notes 551-3
supra.

561 TENT. Darr No. 6, at 223-4.
562 Id. at 226-27.
563 Id. at 233-34.
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because federal jurisdiction is exclusive, but the Institute's proposal to
allow removal in such cases would make this academic. 564 Injunctions

are not to issue merely to avoid multiple in personam litigation. The
most important and probably most controversial of the new exceptions
is designed to protect civil rights: "to restrain a criminal prosecution
that should not be permitted to continue either because the statute or
other law that is the basis of the prosecution plainly cannot constitutionally be applied to the party seeking the injunction or because the
prosecution is so plainly discriminatory as to amount to a denial of the
equal protection of the laws."5' 6 5
If we must have a list of cases in which anti-suit injunctions are to
be allowable, the Institute's list is not a bad one; it certainly'is better
than the list we have. The in rem, interpleader, government-litigation,
temporary-injunction, and res judicata exceptions are without obvious
ambiguities and should be easy enough to administer.516 The same cannot be said with assurance of the civil-rights and statutory-authorization exceptions. The latter makes it necessary to construe each proffered
federal statute to determine whether or not it authorizes suit injunctions; this inquiry has not proved easy in the past. The civil-rights provision is important and desirable enough to outweigh any objection to
its difficulty of administration, but of course it should be made as
simple as is consistent with the basic policy it embodies.
Whether the ALI's exceptions exhaust the cases in which an injunction is desirable may be debated; so may whether the exceptions are
themselves all warranted. It seems especially unfortunate that nothing
is said about injunctions against prosecutions not yet instituted; the
case for statutory specification seems equally strong whether or not the
state suit has begun. But my objection is more fundamental. The attempt to specify exceptions is an understandable attempt to make sure
the courts do not err by granting either too few or too many injunctions. But specificity necessarily creates problems of statutory construction and runs the serious risk of excluding unforeseen cases of urgent
need.
Anti-suit injunctions, whether litigation is pending or threatened,
are undesirable because of the friction they cause. But sometimes they
are the only effective means of protecting federal rights, as in labor
disputes in which a state-court injunction might effectively destroy an
at 232-33.
565 Id. at 226.
564 Id.

566 The "in rem" label, however, is neither wholly self-defining nor very relevant
to injunction policy.
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organizational campaign despite the state court's lack of jurisdiction,5 7
and in cases in which state courts are unwilling to prevent prosecutions
for the exercise of constitutional rights. Both these cases have been
held outside the permissive terms of the present statute; while the
ALI proposal would partly correct these omissions, additional cases
requiring an injunction may appear at any time. I think the courts
should be free to deal with them according to the demands of policy. I
would suggest a simple statute underlining that the test for an injunction against suit is more strict than the ordinary equitable requirements. The Fourth Circuit's formulation, impermissible as a statutoryconstruction device, seems appropriate as a new statute: The federal
courts shall not enjoin pending or threatened proceedings in state
courts unless there is no other effective means of avoiding grave and
irreparable harm. 68
Civil-rights litigation, however, is a very special case. Perhaps the
greatest single flaw in the present Judicial Code is the absence of an
effective remedy to protect civil-rights workers against improper prosecutions. Habeas corpus has never caught on as a pre-trial remedy,
though the statutory exhaustion requirement applies only to persons
already convicted by a state court, and though the judicially created
exhaustion requirement could and should be held satisfied if the state
fails to provide a means of protecting the litigants against the burdens
of the trial itself.56 9 Removal, which the Supreme Court effectively
destroyed in the nineteenth century by reading into the predecessor
of section 1443 the requirement that the petitioner attack a state
statute on its face, 570 enjoyed a brief flurry of popularity a few years
back until the Supreme Court killed it again by adhering, except in
public-accommodation cases, to the earlier test. 571 The possibility of
567 See Amalgamated Clothing Wkrs. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 526 (1955)
(dissent). The need for an injunction has been somewhat alleviated by the relaxation of
finality for appealing state-court labor injunctions, see Construction Laborers v. Curry,
371 U.S. 542 (1963), and by the holding that a contempt citation cannot stand in such
cases if the state-court injunction is ultimately set aside, In re Green, 369 U.S. 689
(1962).
568 See Baines v. City of Danville, 37 F.2d 579, 593 (4th Cir. 1964).
569 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. II, 1967); Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting

Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to
Abort State Trial, 113 U. PA. L. Rtv. 798, 882-908 (1965).

570 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
571 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780
(1966) (public accommodations). The distinction is not satisfactory. Moreover, Peacock
limited the companion provision for removal of one prosecuted for acts "under color of
authority" of certain federal laws to federal officers and others aiding enforcement, while
Rachel held free-speech claims outside the removal provisions.
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an injunction, brightened by Dombrowski v. Pfister572 and by assertions in the lower courts that the 1871 Civil Rights Act "expressly
authorized" anti-suit injunctions, 78 was dimmed considerably when
the Court held in Cameron v. Johnson, even without considering section 2283, that the protected nature of a state-court defendant's activities did not justify an injunction against prosecution. 574
Something ought to be done about this situation. Some state courts
have shown themselves unable or unwilling to prevent the prosecution
of civil-rights workers who have done no wrong. Anyone doubting the
accuracy of this statement need only read Professor Amsterdam's
graphic description of Mississippi justice 575 to be convinced and horrified. But drafting the most appropriate response is no mean task.
Bills have been introduced in Congress from time to time to broaden
removal in these cases. The 1966 Civil Rights Bill, for example, would
have allowed removal by any defendant being prosecuted for exercising his rights of racial equality or for exercising his constitutional
freedoms in advocating racial equality, and also by any Negro or civilrights worker prosecuted on any ground in a state in which Negroes
were systematically discriminated against in the courts. 575 The ALI
proposal, directed toward the same two abuses-prosecution for protected activity and harassment by groundless prosecution for acts not
directly related to protected activity-is considerably more conservative: The activity must be "plainly" protected, and the unrelated prosecution must be shown in the individual case to be "so plainly discriminatory as to amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws." 577
I think the ALI is too grudging with respect to the protection of
constitutionally protected activities; because the factual context of a
civil-rights demonstration is so critical in determining whether or not
the activity is protected, and because of the extreme unwillingness
shown by some state courts to enforce federal rights, what is needed is
a federal trial of the facts relevant to the constitutional claim. In all
probability, if a policeman testified that a demonstrator struck him
with a sign, the federal court could not find the prosecution "plainly"
forbidden; yet, it is precisely in cases of conflicting testimony that an
impartial trier of fact is most indispensable and Supreme Court re572

573

380 U.S. 479 (1965).
See note 536 supra.

890 U.S. 611 (1968).
575 Amsterdam, supra note 569, 118 U. PA. L. REv. at 794-9.
576 S. 2923, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), Title IV.
577 TENT. DRAFT No. 6,at 42, § 1372(7).
574
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view least effective. 78 I am not perturbed by allegations that providing
for a federal trial of the facts would deprive the states of the power of
enforcing their criminal laws; when the states learn to enforce their
laws fairly, they may be permitted to enforce them. In the meantime
the protection of constitutional rights of expression and of racial
equality are far more important than the preservation of the sensibilities of state officials. As in the congressional proposal noted above, the
remedial statute should be limited to racial-equality cases since it is
in the battle for racial equality that state courts have most flagrantly
displayed an incapacity to do justice.
Much more troublesome to me is what to do about prosecutions not
directly related to protected activity but designed to harass those with
the temerity to challenge existing patterns of racial discrimination. The
recent prosecution of Aaron Henry579 strongly suggests such harassment
and demonstrates as well the ineffectual attempts of the Supreme
Court to deal with the problem on direct review. Federal habeas corpus
after conviction allows re-examination of the facts, 580 but it comes too
late to avoid the hardships of long and costly state-court proceedings,
excessive bail or incarceration pending final decision, and the lingering
cloud of criminal charges as an encumbrance on the ability to hold a
job or to live a normal life. Yet the sweeping proposal of the 1966
Civil Rights Bill is not a pleasant prospect. It is one thing to ask the
federal courts to examine prosecutions arising directly out of civilrights demonstrations, since the frequency of such prosecutions is manageably small and the likelihood of overreaching by state officials great.
It is quite another thing to allow every Negro prosecuted in Mississippi
to remove his trial to the federal court. The impairment of the state's
legitimate interests in a law enforcement is much greater under such
a proposal, as is the burden imposed on the federal courts; and while
it may be that Negroes are never treated with proper respect or fairness in Mississippi courts, it is surely not true that every prosecution of
a Mississippi Negro is likely to be on a false charge. Moreover, when
the petitioner has no federal defense to the prosecution it is not entirely
578 The proposal is further weakened by the commentary's explanation that the
state law in question, or one just like it, must have been "authoritatively determined"
to be invalid on its face or as applied to such a case. TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 230. The
absence of precedent is irrelevant to the need for an injunction, and the requirement
as defined leaves litigants defenseless against newly enacted laws. Without the definition
the term "plainly" would invite litigation over the imponderable boundary between
unconstitutional and very unconstitutional laws.
579 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
580 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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clear that the case is one constitutionally arising under federal law
and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Accordingly, I think the provision for federal protection against
harassment of civil-rights workers for conduct not directly related to
their protected activities should be narrower than that proposed in the
1966 bill. The ALI's proposal, on the other hand, is likely to have very
little effect. It requires not only a showing that the prosecution is
!'plainly discriminatory" but also that it amounts to a denial of equal
protection. "Discriminatory" by itself requires something more than
proof that no crime was in fact committed; the test should not be
further qualified by the impossible standard of "plainly," which is likely
to deprive the defendant of a federal trial of the crucial issue of bad
faith. Moreover, the requirement that the prosecution deny equal protection is at best confusing. Perhaps the phrase is tautological: Discriminatory enforcement of laws is by definition a denial of equal protection. Prosecution with no evidence is also a deprivation of liberty or
property without due process; 581 completeness suggests due process
should also be mentioned if "discriminatory" is not sufficient, In addition, "discriminatory" does not fully capture the essence of the problem. Prosecution under a statute seldom used is, of course, one way to
harass unpopular people; prosecution for common offenses on trumpedup charges is another. I think bad faith, the term used by the Supreme
Court in discussing anti-suit injunctions, 5 2 should be added to "discriminatory" and the confusing, possibly redundant reference to equal
protection removed.
My proposal would require the federal court to dismiss unless it
found the unrelated prosecution baseless or discriminatory; it could
not proceed to try the facts and determine whether an offense had in
fact been committed. Thus the courts would be unable to protect fully
against harassment, but full protection could be assured only at the
enormous cost of allowing all suits against civil-rights workers to be
tried in federal court. This would be better than the proposal to include all suits against Negroes, since by no means all Negroes are active
fighters for equal rights and since the greatest danger of harassment
is to those who are. I think the broader proposal would be constitutional: If it is demonstrated that Negroes are excluded from electing
judges, or from sitting on juries, or if they systematically are given
higher sentences or subjected to higher bail than other people similarly
situated, the likelihood that the state courts will treat Negroes or their
advocates unfairly is substantial enough to make a federal trial forum
an appropriate means of assuring that the state does not deny them
5sl Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
582 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).
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the equal protection of the laws. Such cases, even without a specific
federal defense except the probability of unfair treatment by state
courts, would arise under federal law-the statutory grant of jurisdiction as a reasonable exercise of the power given by the fifth section of
583
the fourteenth amendment.
Whether therefore the statute ought to provide a federal forum
whenever a civil-rights worker is prosecuted in a state whose courts
are unfair to Negroes, or only to allow a federal court to abort charges
that are baseless or discriminatory, depends upon the gravity and extent of state-court impropriety in this sort of case. In the absence of
more detailed evidence I favor the more limited version, especially because requiring proof that the claim is without basis would permit the
statute to be drafted without the necessity of defining the class within
its protection. To protect the civil-rights worker alone would be incomplete, for he can be harassed by prosecution of his family and
friends; even to define the civil-rights worker, outside the context of a
prosecution for civil-rights activity directly, would be difficult,58 4 and
defining his friends and relations adequately would be impossible. The
problem, in other words, is not one that can be wholly solved without
doing away with state criminal jurisdiction altogether, and perhaps
with state civil jurisdiction too.
It remains to discuss whether injunction, removal, or habeas corpus
is the best avenue for providing federal relief against improper state
prosecutions. The ALI favors injunction, because removal has the
disadvantage of automatically stopping the state proceeding before it
has been determined to be illegal.58 5 Removal need not have this consequence, and it can be argued that the everyday process of removal is
less irritating than the extraordinary, peremptory command of the injunction. But the injunction has the advantage of making clear that
the federal court is expected only to determine the single issue of federal
right, while removal suggests, though again it could be made otherwise, that the entire trial is to be federal. More serious are the technical limitations of removal and of habeas corpus as they have been
defined. A case can be removed only after it has been fied in state
court, and habeas lies, so far, only if there is some form of custody or
restraint of the state-court defendant.5 8 6 It does not work if the de583 See the discussion of protective jurisdiction, text at notes 68-73 supra.
584 Would a single letter to the mayor suffice? Participation in a march ten years
before?
585 TENT. D AFr No. 6, at 114.
586 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964). For relaxation of this requirement see Jones v. Cunningham,

371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole); Peyton vi Rowe, 890 US. 978 (1968) (sentence not yet being
served).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:268

fendant is only to be fined or to be subjected to civil liability, or if he
is free on bail. A statute, of course, could remove these limitations at
the expense of the English language; although terminology ought to
be the least of our worries, I agree with the ALI that injunction lends
itself best to covering the diverse situations in which federal protection
should be provided.
Finally, I think it clear that a special provision must be made to
assure that such injunctions will in fact be issued. In all but civilrights cases I think it sufficient to provide that injunctions against suit
may be granted only when necessary to prevent grave and irreparable
harm. But under just such a formulation, developed by the courts
themselves without statutory compulsion, the Supreme Court has recently held that an injunction will not issue to forbid prosecution for
civil-rights activities protected by the Constitution in Mississippi. 587
Congress should make clear its disagreement.
A serious question is whether there ought to be a requirement of exhaustion of state remedies before seeking the federal injunction. In
cases not involving civil rights such a requirement makes sense; if there
is a reasonably efficient pre-trial state procedure for protecting the federal right, it should be first explored in order to minimize friction. But
to require Mississippi picketers to ask the state courts to enjoin prosecution seems rather futile. The likelihood of a state's acting improperly,
of course, will be relevant to the plaintiff's case for proving irreparable
injury, but the statute should make clear that the necessity for federal
protection of civil rights is so great and the likelihood of state impropriety so high that the delays and costs of applying for state pre-trial
relief need not always be incurred.
The ALI also proposes to relax the Supreme Court's virtually absolute ban on state-court injunctions against federal proceedings. 588 The
amendment is a good thing; there may be occasions when, as in the
filing of multiple actions on a cause of action already concluded by
judgment, the state court is in the best position to prevent irreparable
harm. But the danger that state-court injunctions might interfere with
the legitimate operations of the federal courts, and the frequent insufficiency of Supreme Court review to correct the excesses of state
courts in injunction cases, suggest that the ALI is right in defining the
occasions for such injunctions very strictly. The two categories are easy
to understand: "to protect the jurisdiction of the court over property in
its custody or subject to its control" and "to protect against vexatious
587 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
588 Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 US. 408, 412 (1964), admitted in dictum the
possibility of state-court injunctions to protect in rem jurisdiction.
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and harassing relitigation of matters determined by an existing judg9' 8 9
ment of the State court in a civil action.
The problem of multiple litigation deserves special mention. Two
suits over a single controversy are almost never tolerable. The policy
against the resultant waste of time and money is reflected in federal
rules respecting res judicata and pendent jurisdiction. Yet the notion
persists that a party is free to sue the same defendant twice at the same
time, though not consecutively, or that a defendant may sue the plaintiff
in another court at the same time. A race to the courthouse is arbitrary
and unseemly, but it is no more so than the present race to judgment
in two suits filed one after the other, and it involves a good deal less
waste. The Judicial Code should be amended to provide that a state
or federal court must stay any action filed, whether in rem or in personam, concerning substantially the same parties and subject matter
already in issue in another court. If, however, because of joinder of
parties or causes the second court can more fully decide the controversy
than can the first, the first suit should be stayed. 590
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

The ALI proposals do not deal with the entire Judicial Code, nor
even with all its jurisdictional provisions. The sections dealing with
court organization are obviously outside the scope of the inquiry. Less
clear, however, is the exclusion of appellate jurisdiction and habeas
corpus from general consideration. The latter omission can be explained by the desire not to jeopardize the new Code by controversial
provisions and the former simply by saying that the district courts are
a big enough problem to tackle at one time. I hope the Institute will
soon give its attention to these other matters too; the passage of the
new Code, if that is to be, should not obscure the real problems that
exist outside it.
The major problem affecting appellate jurisdiction is to free the
Supreme Court from the lingering burden of appeals that it has no
power to decline . 91 The Court can serve its principal function of clarifying important questions of law only if it is free from the obligation
of deciding insignifidant cases; recognizing the conflicting demands on
589 TErN. DRAFr No. 6, at 42-43, § 1373.

590 Present law apparently gives the trial judge considerable discretion in this regard.
See, e.g., Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952) (two federal
actions); Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965) (requiring stay by federal court pending
resolution of a later-filed state reapportionment suit); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103,
106-7 (4th Cir. 1967).
591 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253, 1254(2),
1257(l) (1964).
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its time, the Court has resorted to less than legitimate practices to spare
it undesired appeals. 592 Congress ought to make the certiorari practice
applicable throughout the Court's jurisdiction; since the Supreme
Court is entrusted with the substantive protection of federal rights, it
can be trusted to determine which cases are most in need of review. 3
Especially onerous and without cause are the provisions for direct review of district-court decisions in routine ICC and government antitrust cases; either the Court is required to probe the facts extensively,
with great waste of its time, or the case receives no effective review at
all.594 Government antitrust cases should be reviewed in the courts of
appeals; ICC orders, like those of the NLRB and many other federal
agencies, should be tested in the courts of appeals as well. I also would
repeal the provisions for direct Supreme Court review of orders dismissing criminal indictments5 95 and holding federal statutes unconstitutional in government litigation.590 Surely not all decisions frustrating
97
criminal prosecutions demand the attention of the Supreme Court,
and the ALI's willingness to abolish three-judge courts for testing federal statutes 598 suggests that the companion provision for direct appeal
of constitutional cases is no longer warranted either. Finally, the provision for direct review of three-judge courts in cases attacking state
statutes is a natural response to the fact that three judges hear the case
to begin with; but the speed of direct Supreme Court review is not
called for unless the state law has been held unconstitutional, and in
any event I should prefer to see the three-judge requirement done away
with.
The law of post-conviction review is in quite a mess, thanks in part
to the Supreme Court's commendable expansions of habeas corpus and
to the lack of congressional sympathy. Perhaps in this state of affairs the
reformer is best advised not to stir up the legislative hornets. But
desirable changes would include broadening habeas for military
592 See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Wiener, The Supreme Court's New
Rules, 68 HAv. L. REv. 20, 51 (1954). Cf. the certification practice, discussed in D.
CumuE, FDERAL, CouRTs 223-4 (1968).
593 See Moore & Vestal, Present and PotentialRole of Certification in FederalAppellate
Procedure, 35 VA. L. Rxv. 1, 45 (1949).

594 See the Court's protest against the antitrust provision in United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1 (1963). An ALI proposal to modify this statute, see TENT.
DRAFr No. 5, at 37-38, 209-13, was omitted in the later version because the matter is
under consideration by Congress. TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 247.
595 18 U.S.C. § 3721 (1964).
596 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1964).
597 See generally the critical article by Professor Kurland, The Mersky Case and the
Criminal Appeals Act: A Suggestion for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U. Cm. L. Rxv.

419 (1961).
598 See text at notes 517-8 supra.
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prisoners from its present confused state to the fall relief now afforded
state prisoners; 99 unifying the ragbag of remedies available to the federal civil prisoner;600 and eliminating altogether the weakening custody
requirement. 01 Short of constitutional mootness, every claim of an
unconstitutional conviction or sentence should be given one full hearing in a federal civil court.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps I shall be accused of attempting to put the law of federal
jurisdiction into a strait jacket like that forged by Joseph Beale in the
conflict of laws.60 2 As one who has fought for several years to eradicate
the last traces of Beale's legacy 60 3 I am somewhat sensitive to such a
charge, but I think there is a difference. In the first place, Beale's
system never attained the virtues of simplicity for which it was created.
In the second, he picked the wrong field to stress simplicity: While the
choice between federal and state courts will seldom predictably affect
the outcome of a case, the choice between competing substantive laws
is often a matter of critical importance. I would not sacrifice much for
simplicity; my proposals for eliminating jurisdictional complexity are
based upon the belief that in many cases it is not very important
whether a case is tried in federal or in state court. I should like to
summarize my position, in the words of Judge Charles E. Clark, as
a protest against "the waste, if not frustration, of a trial to decide if
there shall be a trial."
599
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602
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D. CuRuE, FEDERAL. CovaRs 189-98 (1968).
id. at 209-11.
note 586 supra.
J. BEATE, CONFUiCr OF LAWS (1935), passim.

603 See R. CRA&ITON & D. CuRIuE, CONFLIcr OF LAWs (1968), passim.

